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As Korea approaches unification, the growing stability problems in the north
create questions about how these problems can be approached to avoid destabilizing the
peninsula upon unification. This thesis predicts and analyzes the significant stability and
support operations likely to confront the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army during post-
conflict or post-unification proceedings, and presents an employment framework for
United States Army Special Forces designed to support the ROK Army's efforts. The
employment framework is designed to complement a theater-level strategic plan for
conducting stability and support operations (SASO) in the north occurring along a
suggested spectrum of unification possibilities. The framework consists of three
elements: the SASO missions predicted, framework doctrinal elements, and four Korean
unification scenarios. Doctrinal elements include the operations, missions, and unique
roles USASF conduct during SASO. The utility of this thesis is the analysis of
framework doctrinal elements in relation to the SASO missions and unification
environment that may confront USASF while supporting the ROK Army in successful
completion of these missions. The USASF employment framework is intended to be used
as an aid for U.S. military planners at the strategic, operational and tactical levels during
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As Korea approaches possible unification, the South Korean (ROK) Army faces a
situation where warfighting capabilities may not be the sole focus. This situation results
in several questions. What major problems and issues will the ROK Army likely confront
during and after unification? Are problems likely to vary significantly depending on
whether Korea unifies through war or unification occurs short of war? What missions
and tasks, other than wartime missions, may the ROK Army be called upon to execute in
support of stabilizing the peninsula throughout unification and post-unification
proceedings? Finally, if Korea unifies in the foreseeable future, what role can United
States Army Special Forces (USASF) play in assisting the ROK Army throughout the
unification and post-unification process? Sound assumptions are critical in a predictive
study of this nature; a short discussion of these assumptions is in order.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis rests on four assumptions: first, that in the future North and South
Korea will unify as one nation-state; and second that, the government in Seoul will
provide the vision for a future unified Korea. I do not discount the possibility that
military or political persons in the North will participate in the formulation of a unified
vision for Korea. Nor do I discount unification fostered by the United Nations. However,
I do assert that Seoul's political leadership and experience in the interdependent
international community will provide the impetus for a future unified Korea, whether
unification occurs in the short-term, long-term or is fostered by the United Nations. How
unification may occur results in the third assumption.
A united Korea will occur either through war or unification short of war. Either
category results in several broad unification scenarios. I assume that Korean unification
in the future will occur along a spectrum composed of the following four major
unification scenarios: (1) the all-out war scenario where one side strikes first followed by
complete escalation, (2) the sue-for-peace scenario where the North conducts a limited
attack followed by consolidation and a request for negotiated peace, (3) the sudden all-out
absorption of the North by the South, and (4) the phased mutual consent transition
1
between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and ROK governments
resulting in one nation-state on the peninsula.
1
This broad spectrum of unification
possibilities contains mass chaos on one end and nervous expectations of extreme
difficulties on the other end of the spectrum. The final assumption addresses the ROK-
U.S. security arrangement in view of a unified Korea.
Upon unification, I assume that the current ROK-U.S. security arrangement will
remain valid in theory although modifications in the scope and size of U.S. military force
commitment may be prudent. Both the ROK and U.S. governments have espoused the
continuation of a security agreement while discussing future reductions in U.S. military
presence." Counterarguments to the assumptions underpinning this thesis deserve brief
consideration at this time.
The argument that peaceful unification will never take place on the peninsula
because of political ideologies and deep-rooted mistrust between the two governments is
valid.
3 Some analysts base this observation on the fact that the DPRK government is not
rational, and its juche ideology, based on self-reliance, will not contemplate adapting to
meet new challenges. However this observation is not supported entirely by history.
As Nicholas Eberstadt observes, "If the DPRK has been fanatical, that fanaticism
has evidently not inured it to very practical considerations. A capacity for sophisticated
calculation and adept management, in fact, would seem to be suggested by what has not
occurred in North Korea."
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Since the mid- 1 980' s the DPRK has attempted to modify its
economic policies to expand trade and encourage foreign investment in the northern
economic zone. The North Korean government's rapprochement with the United States
and agreements on several confidence building measures, including liaison offices and a
freeze on continued nuclear material production ( 1 994 Nuclear Agreement) are signals
that the DPRK realizes self-preservation in the twentieth century is not compatible with
isolation. Similarly, these signals should not be mistaken to mean that the Kim Jong D
regime is dedicated to western style reform designed to benefit the citizens of North
Korea. Viewing these "reforms" as manipulation of the international diplomatic system
to ensure survival of the DPRK political elite is a more appropriate definition. Marcus
Noland's hypothesis that the North Korean regime will "muddle through" the current
famine and economic crisis with external aid by initiating ad-hoc adjustments and
reforms addresses this notion.
5 The future of the current security arrangement between
the U.S. and ROK is the center of heated debate among Korean and U.S. defense analysts.
The arguments that Korean unification can only occur peacefully upon complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces, or that ROK military advancements negate the requirement for
a U.S. force presence, are advanced by many analysts.6 Advocates of U.S. military
withdrawal from the peninsula suggest that a U.S. force presence only ensures that the
DPRK will continue to posture for war. The current U.S.-ROK security arrangement,
including the stationing of 37,000 U.S. military personnel, should be reviewed. I agree
that there is room for reducing the U.S. force commitment. However, military-to-military
engagement is a crucial aspect of the U.S. national security policy of engagement and
enlargement.
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Additionally, it is unlikely that a unified Korean government will allow for
complete security disengagement from the U.S. considering Japan's continued security
arrangement with America. A prudent, conservative approach to partial military
disengagement in Korea is best, and any planned military departure should be conducted
in phases tied to similar arms and troop reductions on the part of the DPRK. The limits
bounding this predictive thesis deserve consideration.
B. LIMITATIONS
A detailed discussion of the history between North and South Korea is not
included in this study.
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I have framed this thesis to assist the planners and commanders
facing the possible employment of USASF on the peninsula. A lengthy explication of
Korean history will only dilute the message. In addition, this thesis does not discuss
command relationships or recommendations for task organization in relation to general
purpose forces and U.S. Army Special Forces.9 Similarly, this thesis does not trace the
history or seek to establish the utility of USASF involvement in peacekeeping
operations.
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The framework for employment of USASF which I propose is designed to
function within existing command and control relationships. Finally, a detailed
examination of other U.S. forces critical to successful unification efforts on the peninsula
is not possible within the constraints of this thesis.
A general discussion of the important link between U.S. Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Units is elucidated within the employment framework. I
recognize how critical this link is to successful civil-military efforts by the ROK Army
during unification proceedings. However, proper coverage of this topic would require a
separate thesis for appropriate detail.
In researching this thesis I have focused my efforts in four areas: Korean
unification literature, literature explicating the unifications occurring in Germany and
Yemen, U.S. Army Special Forces doctrine and U.S. Army lessons learned during
Stability and Support Operations* in South America, Panama and Haiti. Use of a wide
range of unification literature ensures that the identification of general issues and
problems from previous national unifications are addressed. Most important though, is
focusing on the Korean aspects of those general issues and identifying the scope of the
problems that may confront the ROK Army.
Koreans and non-Koreans have written about North and South unification
proposals since the early 1960s. Hakjoon Kim's thorough comparative study of each
state's unification proposals in Unification Proposals ofNorth and South Korea provides
an understanding of the diplomatic and domestic difficulties surrounding peaceful
unification on the peninsula. Current analysts' predictions about unification scenarios
and issues surrounding unification are expertly covered in several papers written for the
1996, 7th Korea Institutefor Defense Analyses (KIDA) International Defense
Conference, and Nicholas Eberstadt's book, Korea Approaches Unification. Historic
predictions of major problems and issues that may arise during Korean unification were
drawn from Manfred Gortemaker's, Unifying Germany: 1989-1990 and Charles Dunbar's
insightful article, The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics and Prospects.
The framework for employing U.S. Army Special Forces is developed from
doctrine contained in FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, and FM
(SASO) replaced the previous U.S. Army doctrinal term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
and is reflected in the current U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support Operations.
4
3 1-20, Doctrinefor Special Forces Operations. Additionally, the framework is
influenced by lessons learned in the three SASO cases highlighted earlier. These lessons
learned are documented in Joint Forces Quarterly, Special Warfare Bulletin, After Action
Reviews and personal interviews with Army Special Forces commanders and soldiers that
participated in some of these operations. The U.S. Army doctrinal and lessons learned
literature assist in establishing the high degree of utility U.S. Army Special Forces
provide in SASO operations. What conclusions do I derive in this predictive study?
C. CONCLUSIONS
The main hypothesis I propose is: The U.S. Army Special Forces have a key role
in assisting the ROK Army plan and conduct successful SASO operations during
unification and post-unification efforts on the Korean peninsula. The Stability and
Support Operations that may occur during unification include: displaced personnel
management, humanitarian relief operations, and military restructuring. 11 Displaced
personnel missions range from controlling substantial displacement of North Koreans
into South Korea and northward into China, and maintaining displaced personnel camps
in the North. Humanitarian relief missions include food distribution, security of food
shipments to the North, and medical issues ranging from malnutrition to possible
epidemics. Military restructuring of a combined 1 .7 million man military into a
reasonable defense force poses significant problems. Foremost restructuring issues that
may confront the ROK Army include: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in the North, accountability and securing of redundant, incompatible (NATO,
Warsaw pact) systems, and implementation of military personnel downsizing. Regardless
of how unification occurs, these major problems are likely to be present in one degree or
another. Considering the uncertainty of unification occurring in Korea, how relevant is a
study of U.S. Army Special Forces employment in support of unification efforts?
In the future, a stable unified Korea is in the best interest of the United States, the
Pacific region and the international community. A key aspect of successful unification
will be how fast the Korean government can stabilize a potentially chaotic situation
internally in order to prevent destabilizing the region. If Nicholas Eberstadt's observation
is correct, "Nearly all of the great events that have defined Korea since the peninsula's
partition have caught policy-makers unprepared," then we should prepare now to avoid
repeating past mistakes, and we should discover similar circumstances before they
become new mistakes.
United States Army Special Forces have a critical role in assisting the ROK Army
to support the government's stabilization efforts. Besides offering strategic, operational
and tactical expertise to the Korean Army, the low-key presence of U.S. Army Special
Forces advisors at the tactical level provides a comprehensive monitoring and observer
element for the U.S. government. In addition, regional allies will be reassured by having
a limited U.S. military presence to assist in the transition of Korea from two states to one
nation. Finally, the high utility gained by engaging Korea through such a small force
(USASF) allows the U.S. to redeploy the majority of its 37,000 military personnel
following unification without losing the critical forward deployed presence required by
U.S. national security policy. USASF' s history of providing excellent regional expertise
is more than legendary.
USASF's unique capabilities are tailored to produce efficient, effective results
with low signature and high payoff in a host nation stabilization environment. The three
SASO cases that best represent this efficiency are Operations Uphold Democracy in Haiti,
Safe Border in Peru and Ecuador, and Promote Liberty in Panama. 13 The versatility of
USASF is evident from Operations Promote Liberty Cause and Uphold Democracy as
USASF was prepared to, and in the case of Panama, did conduct offensive military
operations in support of the Combatant Commander's strategic plan. In both cases
USASF transitioned from military offensive missions to nation-building, and in the case
of Haiti, coalition support as well. At one point in Haiti over 37 USASF A-Detachments
(SFODA) were deployed throughout Haiti. These SFODAs conducted missions that
ranged from coalition support with the Bangladesh and Malaysian militaries to unilateral
nation-building support in remote villages.
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Operation Safe Border is an excellent
example of USASF providing U.S. diplomats a low-end alternative to commitment in
stopping the violence between Peru and Ecuador without full-blown involvement. As
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Higgins stated, "Special Forces were critical to the Military
Observers Mission in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) success. The high utility, low-key
involvement of our troops (USASF) was the determining factor in the regional leaders
remaining dedicated to the plan of demilitarization and peace through the auspices of
MOMEP." 15 These missions alone validate the U.S. Army Special Forces skills and
capabilities in these challenging operational environments.
The applicable lessons learned from employing USASF in these operations
represent the limited base of historic examples where U.S. Army Special Forces have
played a critical role in assisting foreign governments to stabilize in dire situations.
These cases are not extolled as comparable in all aspects to the unification problems
Korea may face. However the lessons learned, from a framework standpoint, are
applicable across a broad spectrum of unification scenarios.
D. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS ROADMAP
A tiered format is used to illustrate my argument and guide the reader from a
macro-level analysis of major issues confronting Korea upon unification to a micro-level
analysis of problems that may be delegated to the ROK army. A combination of case
study and comparative analysis research will be used to test the main and subordinate
hypotheses. The major external and internal issues surrounding the previous unifications
of Germany and Yemen will be analyzed to establish a table of lessons learned that can be
compared to problems confronting Korea. Comparing the lessons learned from Germany
and Yemen establishes the critical external and internal issues a unified Korean
government must concentrate on, and more important, for the focus of this thesis, the
internal issues the government should delegate to the ROK Army. Following this
comparison, a macro-level analysis of major external and internal issues confronting
Korea is conducted. This macro look transitions to an in-depth analysis of the SASO
operations in North Korea that the ROK Army may be delegated to conduct. This micro-
level analysis of SASO operations establishes the foundation for the development of an
employment framework for USASF designed to assist the ROK Army in conducting these
challenging SASO issues. This proposed framework, in conjunction with a combined
theater level plan, can assist in stabilization of the peninsula during unification and post-
unification periods.
Endnotes
1 Young C. Kim details three variants of each scenario I discuss in, "Prospects For Korean Unification:
An Assessment," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War: Westview
Press, 1994, pp. 253-259. Kyongsoo Lho, pp. 2-6, elaborates on three unification scenarios referred to as,
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Delegated Authority (C.O.D.A.), and in a hypothetical situation the ROK government could initiate a first
strike without prior knowledge of UNCFC.
2 Jonathan Pollack and Young Koo Cha, "A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-
Korean Security Cooperation", Rand: 1995. At the request of the 24th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM) of October 1992 RAND and KIDA undertook a joint project to assess the status of the
U.S.-ROK security agreement. In addition to agreeing on a continued security agreement between the
U.S. and ROK a recommendation for the future transfer of leadership of the Combined Forces Command
to a ROK general was proposed.
3 The valid concern that peaceful unification may not be possible is forwarded by Nicholas Eberstadt in
"Can the Two Koreas Be One." Foreign Affairs: Winter 1992/93 and William J. Taylor Jr.'s, "Is Peaceful
Unification Possible?" a paper presented at the 7th KIDA International Defense Conference. Seoul,
Korea: November 4-6, 1996.
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Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification, Armonk, NY: The National Bureau of Asian
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6 Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow posit this view on the withdrawal of U.S. forces as critical to
unification on the peninsula as well as basis for a new policy toward Korea in "South Korea: A Vital or
Peripheral U.S. Security Interest?" and "America's Korean Protectorate in a Changed World: Time to
Disengage." in Bandow and Carpenter, eds., The U.S. -South Korean Alliance: Timefor a Change:
Transaction Publishers, 1992.
7 The United States "A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", The White House: February
1996. pp. 14-15. The national strategy espouses the increased employment of military-to-military
engagement as a form of force projection that highlights U.S. commitment to democracy worldwide. The
strategy of engagement is designed to prevent militarization on the part of countries that feel isolated or
contained. By creating global interdependence the U.S. hopes to prevent the possibility for armed conflict
between dependent countries.
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For an excellent study of Korean history see, Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baick Lee, Ick Young, Michael
Robinson and Edward Wagner, Korea Old and New, A History, United States of America: Harvard
University Press, 1990.
9
For an understanding of U.S. Army Doctrine see, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. For an
understanding of U.S. Army Special Operations Doctrine see Fm 31-20.
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For an excellent historical summary of U.S. Special Operation Forces in action over the past 10 years
see, "U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 10th Anniversary History," United States Special
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11
Displaced personnel management is the term the ROK prefer to use when referring to controlling
refugee migration into China, Russia and South Korea. As the North Koreans fleeing South are not
refugees but Korean citizens in the eyes of the ROK government.
12
Nicholas Eberstadt, "Can the Two Koreas Be One.", p. 151.
13 See "Operation Safe Border: Multinational Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru I," United States Special
Operations Command: History and Research Office, September 1995; and Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "In the
Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building Following Just Cause,"
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14 Author was detachment commander of SFODA 191 which served as CST for the Bangladesh battalion
in Port Au Prince from September 1994 to March 1995. The exact number of SFODAs changed from
month to month in Haiti. Author noted this number on a visit to the G3 operations center of the 10th
Mountain Division in Port Au Prince during December 1994.
15 LTC(P) Higgins made this comment during a presentation as an Army Fellow at the Naval Postgraduate
School in March 1997. LTC(P) Higgins was a battalion commander in the 7 th Special Forces Group
(Airborne), and the senior U.S. representative of the 72 man U.S. contingent that successfully led USASF
efforts during MOMEP Phase I in Patuca, Ecuador from 17 February through 21 August 1995. The
mission of USASF was to coordinate efforts and assist the two host nations, alongside other regional
assistance, to monitor a cease-fire and conduct demilitarization of Peru and Ecuador military's.
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II. GERMANY AND YEMEN: UNIFICATION LESSONS FOR KOREA
"The farther backward you can look, thefartherforward you are likely to see.
"
Sir Winston Churchill 1
As the international community speculates on the unification of Korea, it is
prudent to examine if historically some issues are analogous when two states unify. If
some issues are similar in a unification scenario, can Korea learn valuable lessons and
contemplate ideas to resolve these issues prior to unification occurring? The
unifications of Germany and Yemen in 1990 provide the historical examples of issues a
country may confront when contemplating unification.
I propose that analogous issues facing a country during the unification process
fall into two main categories: (1) regional issues and (2) domestic issues. Regionally
the country must consider the balance of power equation resulting from a unified state
which entails future military force structure, any existing treaties or security agreements
and international ramifications in the balancing area. Domestically the unified state
must develop, and implement a sound economic plan which details the economic
restructuring of the state. Additionally the psychological aspects of unifying the peoples
of two separate states cannot be ignored by the government of a new unified nation.
Section one of this chapter establishes the relevance between the issues
surrounding Korean unification and the historic unifications of Germany and Yemen.
Section two outlines the regional issues confronting the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) and the Republic of Yemen during each states' unification process; while section
three details the domestic issues surrounding these two unification cases. The
conclusion extracts the lessons learned from this analysis that may be applicable to
Korea, and reminds the reader that these issues are not intended to be predictions of
what "exactly" will occur in a Korean unification scenario. These historical lessons
learned reflect trends that can assist the Korean government(s) develop a better plan to
offset the historical instability incurred through unification.
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A. QUESTION OF RELEVANCE
Korean unification has many macro-level similarities with Germany and Yemen
as these two states confronted unification in 1989. All three countries share the
distinction of separation due to the Cold War. 2 This separation, orchestrated by the U.S.
and U.S.S.R., ensured all three countries divided along ideological lines. Ideological
separation included economic and social aspects within the separated states as well as
the international diplomatic ramifications of alignment for security purposes. A
comparison analysis of these three states assists establishing relevance.
How do North and South Korea compare in 1997 when viewed against Germany
and Yemen on the eve of their unifications? Table 2-1 provides interesting statistics















45.5 23.9 60.9 16.6 6.9 2.5
GDP (billion) $590.7 $21.5 $1,120 $207.2 $4.5 $1.01
GDP per person $13,000 $920 $18,370 $6,000 $690 $480
Exports (b,m) $125.4 b $840 m $294 b $30.8 b $51. lm $54 m
Imports (b,m) $135.1 b $1.27 b $228 b $31 b $1.4 b $497 m
% GDP - Spent
on Defense
3.3% 25-33% 22% 5.4% 31.3% NA
Note: Monetary unit is $US, and (b,m) refers to $US billion or $US million
Source: CIA World Factbook, 1989 and 1997.
Table 2-1. Comparisons of Social and Economic Indicators in Korea (1996),
Germany (1989), and Yemen (1989).
Every indicator from population to economics has the dominant state, on the eve of
unification, far ahead of their rival. With the exception of North Korea's exorbitant
expenditure on the military this dominance is practically all encompassing.
Economically it is important to note the wide disparity between GDP per household in
the two Koreas. Woo Sik Kee suggests a comparison of per capita consumption
between the two Koreas "... North Korea's private consumption is less than half of
12
GNP (North Korea's), while that of South Korea is more than 65% of GNP", as a better
indicator of disparity in North and South Korean living standards. 3 Although West
Germany's GDP per household was greater than the East's, the disparity was far less
than the gap facing Korea. Today, the problems of transitioning the East German
economy in order to establish an equitable standard of living is still challenging the
government in Bonn. Not to mention that West Germany was in a better position
financially to begin the process of economic transition than South Korea's current
position. As Woo Sik Kee remarks, ".. .the demographic and aggregate economic
features indicated that the relative costs of unification are likely to be much heavier for
South Korea than for West Germany."4 Both East Germany and North Korean State
infrastructures suffer from decay. Like East Germany, the North Koreans will require
mass financial input to update and transform the industrial capability of their state.
For Korea the relevance of these cases lies more in the process that resulted in
unification and not necessarily the statistics of absorption. Although statistics allow us
to "see" problems, it is often too easy to draw inferences from these numbers without
inputting the non-intrinsic aspects in a particular example. As Kenneth Waltz warns,
"Statistical operations cannot bridge the gap that lies between description and
explanation."5 Additionally, Woo Sik Kee highlights that, "Differences in the concepts
or units of economic data also defy comparisons between South and North Korean
economies."6
The inter-country diplomatic dynamics yield some interesting comparisons. The
long journey of unification proposals and inter-Korean dialogue is analogous to both
Yemen and Germany's route toward unification. The 1992 North and South Korea
"Basic Agreement" and "Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula", are similar to diplomacy efforts in Germany that yielded the Helsinki
accords, and Yemen's numerous unification summits. 7 However as detailed later in
this chapter, inter-state dialogue, proposals and exchanges are insufficient if both states
are not sincere. As Yemen's unification will highlight, initial good faith negotiations
are of little value if a plan is not designed, agreed upon and rapidly executed through the
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final phase. As the German example reveals, the overall plan was implemented with a
hurried pace that caught many off guard but succeeded in accomplishing a peaceful
absorption. Not a perfect unification, but peaceful nonetheless. The importance of
establishing a realistic plan, and being prepared to follow through the execution process
is the relevance these cases provide for Korean unification.
B. REGIONAL ISSUES OF GERMANY AND YEMEN'S UNIFICATIONS
Germany and Yemen's unifications involved regional issues that captured the
attention of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. diplomatic officials. Apprehension and uncertainty
of the superpowers was reflected more during the German unification process than that
of Yemen. This was due to the military standoff between the two powers in Germany as
well as Germany's economic potential as a united state. Yemen's unification process
was addressed in regional forums, and severely affected by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
An analysis of the diplomacy process and security issues surrounding these two
unifications highlight the regional issues involved.
1. Diplomacy involved in Germany's Unification Processes
The diplomacy dimensions of German unification were complex. In many
aspects East and West Germany were surrogates of the superpowers, allowing the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. to confront each other ideologically and militarily through the two German
states. The conundrum facing Helmut Kohl (Prime Minister of the FRG), was how to
ensure that a unified Germany remained a NATO member and not be reduced to a
neutral country state in a rapidly growing interdependent European community. The
NATO issue was resolved by arranging an international negotiation forum composed of
the two German states and the four powers that were victorious after World War H
The Ottawa Declaration, signed in February 1990, announced to the world that
the four powers and the two German states would jointly work out the external aspects
o
of German unification. The two-plus-four talks allowed France, Great Britain, the
United States and the Soviet Union to come to terms with the inevitable unification of
Germany. Assuaging the Soviet Union's fears of a united Democratic Germany and
preparing Europe for the removal of a 45 year old psychological/physical boundary were
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the main emphasis of the talks. The Soviets posited three major security concerns
surrounding German unification: (1) the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany,
(2) a decrease in NATO forces throughout Europe and (3) the corresponding decrease in
German forces.9 None of the Soviet concerns were hotly contested as the U.S. realized
the diminishing capability of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War required a
reassessment of military force levels in Europe. The Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl agreed in a private conference on February 10, 1990 that a
united Germany would remain in the NATO alliance uncontested by the Soviet Union.
This agreement stipulated no NATO forces allowed in the former East Germany and the
two heads of State agreed on an initial German force of 370,000 personnel. 10 The
NATO Summit in July 1990 continued to address security and policy issues of German
unification designed to ease Soviet Apprehension of a united Germany in NATO. 11
Unlike Germany, Yemen's diplomatic process on the road to unification was primarily
regionally oriented.
2. Diplomacy Involved in Yemen's Unification
On May 22, 1990 the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South
Yemen) and Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, North Yemen) unified; the state was
renamed the Republic of Yemen (see Figure 2-1). The process for this historic moment
in the Arab region began in 1967. Yemen unification occurred after an extended five
phase diplomatic process. Efforts included four major regional unification summits
involving Arab neighbors held in Cairo, Tripoli, Kuwait and South Yemen. 12 After 22
years of disputes and border wars this apparently sincere diplomatic effort resulted in a
unified Yemen nation.
The end of the Cold War saw the significance of North and South Yemen
dwindle in the eyes of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Port of Aden was important
to the Soviets during the Cold War, but neither state was critical to the superpowers as
the Cold War ended. In May 1990 Yemen was confronted with a regional conflict in
Kuwait that rekindled tension with long-time adversary Saudi Arabia, and catapulted an










Source: "Yemen and Stability in the Persian Gulf," SSI, May 1996.
Figure 2-1. A Divided Yemen
held the chair as President of the Security Council and lobbied for an "Arab Solution."
Yemen opposed United States involvement and joined Jordan in lobbying for the Arab
League to solve the crisis. This was vigorously opposed by the U.S. and the Saudi
government. 13 A united Yemen's pro-Iraqi stand in the United Nations would prove to
be a near-fatal mistake for a struggling country in its first year of unification. Yemen's
diplomatic support for Iraq did not affect the outcome of the Gulf War or help Iraq in
any way. The result of Yemen's pro-Iraqi stance was regional isolation and withdrawal
of sorely needed economic aid from the U.S. An analysis of the security issues
surrounding Germany and Yemen's unifications is next.
3. Security Issues Surrounding German Unification
Both Helmut Kohl and President Reagon realized a united Germany would
require a broader security agreement with the United States or face domestic German
pressure for complete withdrawal of foreign military presence. The original U.S.-FRG
security agreement was narrowly focused on Cold War military aspects whereas a new
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agreement required a commitment by the U.S. to a united Germany and the future
development of the East European countries surrounding Germany. This development
would become the primary responsibility of Germany, however Helmut Kohl was
concerned that Germany would be overwhelmed with ethnic problems in the former
Soviet satellites and was wisely seeking commitments early on from the U.S. The final
agreement saw U.S. force presence reduced to 150,000 troops remaining in the former
West Germany. United States involvement in the Bosnia crisis, both diplomatic and
militarily, represents a broader U.S. commitment to stability in the East European
region. A post-unification foreign policy for Germany was Helmut Kohl's next order of
business.
The foreign policy for a united Germany would be characterized by
multilateralism. Helmut Kohl did not want to limit Germany's ability to deal with the
anticipated regional and international instability resulting from unification. The new
Germany would have a broad range of agreements, allowing the nation to take
advantage of several foreign policy vehicles while operating with limited resources.
Helmut Kohl rested the future Germany's policy on four pillars: (1) NATO, (2) the
WEU, (3) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and (4) the
European Community (EC). 14 Each of these pillars offered Germany a specific vehicle
for addressing future issues. NATO provided the military security umbrella that was
proven and allowed Germany to focus on less stable aspects of their foreign policy
foundation. The WEU and CSCE provided Germany the means to discuss European
economic issues and general issues affecting all of Europe, while the EC allowed
Germany to focus on issues surrounding the struggling former Soviet satellite countries
in East Europe. These pillars allowed Germany to participate in institutions already
established, thus allowing the new nation to focus on critical domestic issues while
participating regionally. Yemen's security issues upon unification were focused on
long-time border rival Saudi Arabia.
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4. Security Issues Surrounding Yemen's Unification
Regionally, the Republic of Yemen quickly found an economic and security
alliance. Allying with Iraq and Jordan in the Iraqi led Arab Cooperation Council
(ACC), President Ali Abdullah Salih of Yemen sent a clear signal of balancing to Saudi
Arabia. 15 For Yemen, this alliance allowed for a balance of power against Saudi Arabia
and the promise of economic stimulus for the new state. For Saudi Arabia this alliance
ignited a fear that had burned off and on since conflict with the YAR began in 1967.
Saudi Arabia has harbored two major concerns in reference to a unified Yemen
state: (1) a numerically superior antagonistic neighbor, and (2) the Asir province
promises a direct oil pipeline to the Indian Ocean (see Figure 2-1). A separated Yemen
state ensured the Saudi government did not face a powerful neighbor and allowed the
Saudi' s to exploit the Asir province. Prior to unification, the Saudis linked financial aid
to South Yemen to access rights in the Asir province. 16 From the Saudi's viewpoint, a
financially strengthened and united Yemen may deny easy exploitation of this province.
A summary of the regional concerns facing theses two states upon unification is
helpful prior to analyzing the domestic issues surrounding their unification's. Table 2-2
represents the two states regional concerns upon unification, and a short summary
resulting from their actions. The domestic unification issues confronting Germany and




1. Inter-state and External Dialogue:
Ottawa Declaration
2. established the two-plus four talks
which resolved external aspects with
major powers;
3. CFE Treaty: established military
forces maximums
4. Kohl - Gorbachev Conference:
eliminated Soviet interference
1
. Security Agreement Type
Multilateralism: Vehicles were
NATO/WEU/CSCE/EC;
2. Relationship with U.S.:
reduced U.S. force presence




Inter-Yemen summits: proposals, no
agreements
2. Regional powers participation: did
not facilitate the process
3. Iraq - Kuwaiti conflict: poor
decision to side with Iraq
1. Security Agreement Type:
primarily bilateral with Iraq
2. Relationship with Saudi Arabia:
worsened during post-unification
Table 2-2. Germany and Yemen Regional Unification Issues and their Outcomes
C. DOMESTIC ISSUES OF GERMANY AND YEMEN'S UNIFICATIONS
Internally the German and Yemen unifications contained destabilizing issues
that, in some ways, were dealt with differently by each state. Military integration,
economic integration and societal integration were three major areas that required
planning and forethought prior to each state undergoing unification. For Germany a
well prepared plan that addressed these major domestic issues did prevent these
problems from developing into destabilizing factors. For the Yemen government, lack
of planning assisted in creating the environment for an inter-Yemen civil war.
1. Germany's Military Force Integration
With both a well-defined strategic security and regional foreign policy vision a
united Germany now focused on the process of merging and downsizing the two States
military forces. On October 3, 1990 Germany was officially unified and had a
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combined military force numbering 590,000 personnel. In agreement with the two-plus-
four talks, a united Germany would field a force of no more that 370,000 personnel.
This agreement required a reduction of 222,000 personnel as well as disposal of excess
military equipment. Germany's plan for reduction focused on three areas: (1) a
personnel downsizing plan, (2) restructuring the Bundeswehr (FRG military
organization) and (3) an excess military equipment disposal plan. In the short-term, the
personnel downsizing plan was most important.
The West German government in Bonn allowed the FRG Bundeswehr to outline
a personnel downsizing plan for the merging of the GDR National Peoples Army (NVA
- National Volksarmeel) with the FRG forces. The Bonn government realized that
exclusion of NVA personnel from the military would alienate the population, increase
unemployment and perhaps cause a sovereignty issue for Bundeswehr forces conducting
security missions in the former East Germany. 17 The Bundeswehr was faced with
reducing an NVA force of 100,000 in 1990 to a projected force of 50,000 by 1994. A
phased personnel downsizing plan was implemented. The transitioning plan included
dismissing all general and senior officers over the age of 50, shortening the conscription
term from 18 to 12 months for enlisted personnel, and implementing a rigorous two-
year selection process for the remaining 23,000 NVA officers. The goal was to build a
force to serve in the former East Germany consisting of 5,000 officers, 15,000 NCOs
and 25,000 enlisted personnel. The remaining 5,000 of the 50,000 man force would
1 ft
include Bundeswehr officers and NCOs. Timing was critical to the downsizing
announcement. The Bonn government announced the NVA military personnel
downsizing and reorganization plan on the day of unification, thus reducing anxiety for
NVA defense personnel.
The reorganization of the Bundeswehr to accept the former NVA forces while
downsizing its own structure was conducted in phases. The first phase established an
Armed Forces Eastern Command consisting of an Army, Air Force and Naval
Command (see Figure 2-2). A critical Liaison Command for Soviet forces allowed for
coordinating redeployment of Soviet military personnel and equipment by the 1994
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deadline. The second phase developed a transitional Army corps in the East consisting
of two divisions and all required logistics and services units (see Figure 2-3). The final
phase resulted in the reduction of the Bundeswehr 3d Corps and the reorganization into
the Northern, Southern and Eastern Commands (see Figure 2-4). The Northern and
Southern Commands control three divisions each and Bonn projected the total strength
by 1995 to be 255,000 personnel.
Army Eastern
Command
Source: Gordon, "German Unification and the Bundenswehr" Military Review,
November 1991.
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Figure 2-4. The German New Army Basic Command Organizational Structure
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For the old Bundeswehr this reorganization resulted in a reduction of West German
divisions from twelve to six and consequently the number of warfighting brigades from
48 to 28. 19 The disposal of equipment, materiel and ammunition stocks to satisfy this
downsized military organization was a daunting task.
The magnitude of the excess equipment disposal problem was significant. In
1990 as the old Bundeswehr and former NVA became one, the new organization had an
excess of 41 percent of main battle tanks, 61 percent of armor combat vehicles, 14
percent of fighter aircraft and 42 percent of artillery pieces. 20 These excesses were
exclusive of the equipment expected to redeploy with the Soviet forces by 1995 (see
Table 2-3). Complicating the disposal situation was an estimated 350,000 tons of
ammunition in NVA holdings. With no guarantee that the Soviet Union would pay to
ship their forces ammunition back to Russia, the Bundeswehr faced the possibility of an
additional one million tons of ammunition. The cost associated with destroying
former East German stocks is quoted as low as $937 million to as high as $2.2 billion. 22
Category Number Limit Reduction
Main Battle Tank 7075 4166 2909(41%)
Armored Vehicles 8950 3446 5504(61%)
Artillery 4639 2705 1934 (42%)
Helicopters 259 306
Fighter Aircraft 1050 900 150(14%)
Source: "German Unification and the Bundeswehr", Military Review , November 1991.
Table 2-3. Limits and Reductions of Combat Systems Imposed on German
Bundenswehr
A logical process for disposal of the materiel was developed by the government in Bonn
and the Bundeswehr.
The process for determining materiel retention centered on three main criteria:
(1) a requirement for the system; (2) the system must be logistically supportable; and (3)
the system must be economically viable. The logistic supportability focused on the
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availability and acquisition of spare parts. Economically, parts must be cost effective,
and the probable system modifications were a consideration. Based on these criteria the
Bundeswehr divided all military equipment into three categories for evaluation: (1)
permanent or limited-term use; (2) temporary systems requiring evaluation, and (3)
systems to be disposed of upon unification. The result of these categorization saw the
Bundeswehr cut a majority of older Soviet systems while taking advantage of some
systems with significant ammunition stocks for training purposes. The Soviet ground
weapon systems selected for disposal and phased termination included the T-54 and T-
55 main battle tanks, the BMP-1 and BTR-70 armor combat vehicles, and 122 mm S-l
howitzers. Air weapon systems selected for disposal included the MIG-21, the MIG-23,
and the SU-22 fighter aircraft. No significant NVA naval assets were retained.
The plan for disposal of selected systems consisted of three options: selling,
donating, and scrapping. Of these options, selling or donating systems to former
members of the Warsaw Pact was preferable to scrapping the systems. In 1991 the
German government expected to obtain $US 31.2 million by selling combat support
equipment and spare parts on the civilian market. Similarly, the Gulf War in 1990 -
1 99 1 provided an opportunity to distribute some materiel to member countries of the
Arab coalition. However, as Wolfgang Burr highlights, ". . .80% of all East German
equipment cannot be sold or used by other government departments, and must be
destroyed." Scrapping combat systems was a time consuming and expensive option, but
required in order to comply with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
Yemen's lack of military integration set the stage for civil war following unification.
2. Yemen's Military Force Integration
The continued presence of non-integrated armed forces in the North and South
created an opportunity for conflict. The plan for a unified military organization was
abstractly discussed prior to unification, but again a formal plan with a timeline for
implementation was never established. 27 In addition to the armed forces of the former
North and South, Islah had a formidable army of dedicated fighters. This was a recipe
for disaster and the catastrophe occurred in 1994.
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The civil war in Yemen from April to July 1994 saw Salih consolidate the GPC
power base and politically unify Yemen through war. The presence of two separated
military forces, aligned with their former party's, was the operational cause of the war.
However, Salih' s drive to maintain power would not tolerate challenges to his authority
and the YSP presented such a challenge, real or imagined. 28 The challenging task of
economic integration is analyzed next.
3. Germany's Economic Integration
The economic aspect of German unification was complicated and received
appropriate attention from the government in Bonn. The main economic concern
centered around the economic reconstruction of the former GDR. Transitioning the
GDR economic system into a competitive market oriented system required a detailed
plan. The FRG and GDR agreed in March 1990 to implement a four-phase economic
unification plan designed to rapidly integrate the former GDR economy into the FRG
and allow for a decade long adjustment period. 29 The first phase of the plan focused on
the monetary union between the FRG and GDR. This phase stressed implementation of
FRG economic laws and regulations, price reform and the establishment of exchange
rates. The initial favorable exchange rate for the East German individual savings
investor was 1:1 Ostmarks for Deutschmarks, and a 2.4:1 exchange rate was initially
used for all commercial transactions. 30 The second phase followed the monetary union
in July 1990 and focused on privatization of GDR state enterprises, the establishment of
commercial banking and overhauling the social security system. The third phase
addressed foreign trade, focusing on more efficient policies to ensure trade prospered
and a united Germany was protected. The final phase was implementation of
appropriate policies to ensure the integration of monetary, fiscal, social and employment
policies designed to lift the former GDR economy to the same level as the FRG. 31 The
reality of implementing the four-phase economic plan was far from euphoric.
The economic issues that confronted the Bonn government upon unification
included a dilapidated GDR infrastructure that consisted of outdated industrial
machinery, an underdeveloped and aged transportation/communications structure and
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workforce retraining. Economic optimists on the eve of unification predicted that a
united Germany would produce an economic superpower in a few years. ~ However the
East German economy proved to be "a Potemkin economy or worse - a corrupt,
inefficient, industrial invalid that was hemorrhaging its human resources West." 3 ' Once
the process for transition was decided, the FRG contemplated the cost for transitioning
the GDR to a market based economy.
The financial costs of unification were woefully underestimated. The initial
unified German budget allocated $50 billion for unification efforts and initiated new
taxes to raise an additional $31 billion. 34 However, at the end of 1991 a more realistic
projection of the costs to transition the GDR economy was estimated at $500 billion.
This estimate accurately reflected the costs associated with rebuilding East German
industry and infrastructure, retraining the 9 million man workforce, and providing social
services for former East Germans during the initial years of unification." The direct
and indirect costs of unification resulted in higher taxes, increased deficits, higher
interest rates and subsequently unemployment. The social ramifications of these costs
created resentment among former West Germans. Yemen's economic integration was
less complicated.
4. Yemen's Economic Integration
Economically, Yemen was one of the poorest Gulf states at the time of
unification. The main impetus for unification was the two states need to exploit oil
reserves that lay along the North/South Yemen border. 36 South Yemen had lost all
support from the former Soviet Union as the Cold War ended and North Yemen did not
have access to the main oil fields or the major oil refinery at Aden. The end of the Cold
War and subsequent harsh economic reality, made previous disputes an afterthought
among the two Yemen states.
The immediate economic crisis confronting the Yemeni government upon
unification was the loss of external aid and the influx of deported migrant workers. Due
to Yemen's anti-coalition position during the Gulf War, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) drastically reduced financial aid from $50 million to
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$4 million. Likewise, retribution for Yemen's pro-Iraqi stance was swift from Saudi
Arabia. The Saudi government deported approximately one million Yemen migrant
workers in 1991. 38 The returning migrant workers created two problems: (1) increased
unemployment and (2) loss of remittance income from the workers. For the new united
government, assuming the debts for unification was expected. The Republic of Yemen
assumed the international obligations of the two states which totaled a debt of
approximately $7 billion. In comparison, the gross national product for Yemen in 1990
was $6.6 billion, so this debt was significant. 39
In addition to the above mentioned economic difficulties, a united Yemen faced
the issue of increasing oil exports, attracting foreign investment and implementing
monetary reforms designed to transition to a free market economy. The prior
unification summits were more for show than for substance, and the lack of a formal
economic transition program were apparent by 1992. The former South Yemen
populace became disgruntled by the inability of the new republic to deliver on the
promise for an oil-driven economic turnaround. Yemen's continued meager oil exports
of 130,000 - 140,000 barrels/day in 1992 was justification for the complaint.40 Foreign
investment has been attempted through initiation of a free trade zone centered around
the Port of Aden. This zone offers hope for Yemen to diversify its economic base and
not be solely dependent on oil exports. However, Yemen was a poor country upon
unification and projections for a significant economic surge were a result of political
rhetoric designed to gain popular support for the unification initiative, not projections
based on economic indicators. Serious economic reform requires a program and
government leadership dedicated to rigidly following the details. As of October 1994,
the Republic of Yemen had not enacted a program to implement the monetary reforms
required by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). ' The critical task
of societal integration following unification presented unique problems to Germany and
Yemen.
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5. Germany's Societal Integration
Culturally the two German states were not distinct. The wall did not separate the
unique aspects of being German, only the capability to physically interact. Ideologically
the two state governments were opposites, but culturally the peoples in the East had not
developed a separate national conscious. Klaus von Beyme comments, "Churches, trade
unions and many other social institutions were kept apart by force, but preserved their
organizational similarity." Additionally, the impact of media and increased visitation
rights in the 1980's allowed East Germans to gage their freedoms, and ensured that
neither German population lost its homogenous identity. Integration however brought
resentment.
The speed with which unification occurred could not prevent some hard feelings
once reality struck. Resentment of the East Germans arose primarily from the anxiety
associated with the financial burdens of unification. The financial cost of unification,
viewed as being borne by West Germans, created a pronounced inferiority complex in
East Germans and further complicated the process of integration.43 Although not as
thoroughly analyzed, the societal integration problems confronting North and South
Yemen upon unification provide comparable insights.
6. Yemen's Social Integration
The lack of a significant economic gap between South and North Yemen
resulted in no severe resentment from either state's populace in regard to the financial
strain of unification. The populace was more frustrated with government diplomacy
that resulted in the one million migrant workers in Saudi Arabia being deported and the
subsequent unemployment that resulted. The major stumbling block to complete
integration was internal political turmoil between the former ruling party's of the
separated North and South Yemen.
a. Domestic Political Turmoil
The distribution of power within the new republic was the main issue
fermenting the internal political conflict in Yemen. As agreed upon during the
unification summits, the former General Peoples Congress (GPC) of North Yemen and
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the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) of South Yemen established the new republic's
government with a 50/50 distribution of power. Although equal from a percentage
standpoint, it was evident that the persons making decisions and wielding the power
were from the GPC. Salih (GPC) was named president of the new republic and Ali
Salam al-Baid (YSP) was named vice president. Salih and Baid began allying forces
and strengthening their political positions from the start. Salih had an advantage since
the capital was in Saan'a and he was familiar with the Northern tribes in the area.
Additionally, the YSP's former ideological stance was not popular and party officials
played down their failed past. Salih struck at this weakness in a successful move to
destroy the YSP and establish the GPC as the dominant party.
Ensuring a fierce rival faction confronted and weakened the YSP, under
the auspices of democracy, was Salih' s plan. As the Islamist Yemeni Congress for
Reform or Islah, the Northern Hashid tribe began a relentless political assault against the
former YSP. The 1992 elections saw Islah win a large percentage of seats in parliament
and the YSP power dwindle significantly.45 The political attacks continued until Vice
President Baid finally departed the capital and returned to the former South Yemen
capital of Aden. The newly elected coalition government in Saan'a had marginalized
the importance of the YSP and set the stage for a bloody civil war. The elimination of
the YSP leadership and its military backers during the 1994 civil war completed the
unification process in Yemen. A summary of the domestic unification issues faced by
Germany and Yemen is helpful at this time.
Table 2-4 represents domestic unification issues analyzed, and the
resulting outcomes of decisions by the government's of Germany and Yemen. Next I
will present the lessons learned from the analysis of German and Yemen regional and
domestic unification issues that are applicable to Korean unification.
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caused loss of income
and unemployment
2. Political struggle:
did not allow populace
integration; continued
to split the populace
along political lines
1. Process: no plan,
exploiting oil reserves
the main goal
2. Costs: mainly debt
accrual, no
development planned
3. External aid: dropped
by $US 46 mill.
Table 2-4. Germany and Yemen's Domestic Unification Issues and Decision
Outcomes
D. CONCLUSION
The regional and domestic issues presented in these two historic unification
cases are representative of major problems facing a unified Korea. However, these
cases are not intended to serve as a template for predicting the problems and issues
facing Korea. These cases are best adopted to anticipate possible problems and plan for
courses of action to increase the probability of successful unification. Table 2-5
represents a consolidation of lessons learned from Germany and Yemen's unification
that may be applicable to Korean unification.
Two states conducting serious unification diplomacy must ensure that all major
internal and external power issues are formally resolved prior to a unification
commitment. Existing security agreements should be addressed by all powers and the
two states to ensure that decisions to modify, dissolve or maintain current agreements
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are not a source of future friction for the new unified state. A long-term economic
integration focus is required for a new unifying country. Elements, either political or
non-political, espousing short-term economic euphoria resulting from unification should
be cautious of over estimating a unified state's immediate economic capability.
Resolving the disposition of separate militaries is a crucial step prior to a state unifying.
A decision is required as to whether separate militaries will integrate or one system
faces demobilizaiton. Resolution of this topic is central during the diplomacy process.
Finally, each state must prepare its citizens for unification. Depending on the level of
ideological difference between the populations this process may be very difficult. Years
of preparation may be required prior to unification, if a state's population is unyielding
in its allegiance to an ideology.
As the German example clearly showed, and the Yemen example confirmed,
even a marginal plan implemented with discipline has a better chance of preventing
internal conflict than managing problems as they arise during the unification process.
Diplomacy 1
.
Regional or Internationally sponsored talks must achieve substantive signed
agreements that bind all parties to a course of action prior to unification.




3. A multilateral or collective security agreement allows a united government more
options for regional and international decision-making.
4. Previous bilateral security agreement will require renegotiating, and a phased plan
prior to unification should be considered.
Economic
Integration
5. Long term vision required for any plan adopted.
6. Do not expect direct payoff in monetary terms from integration.




8. Personnel and equipment restructuring plan developed prior to unification.
9. Be prepared to dispose of more combat systems and ammunition than estimated.
10. Implement restructuring plan immediately, reduces opportunity for separatist





Develop a plan to reduce the destabilizing factors that exist as open and closed
societies interact for the first time.
12. Populace should understand the short-term economic sacrifices required to unite
Korea, and the effects it will likely have on their individual lives.
13. Government should implement a plan to educate the populace about the
ideological viewpoints and differences each society is likely to have upon
unification.
Table 2-5. German and Yemen Unification Lessons Learned for Korea
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The ensuing chapter details major problems and issues confronting Korea as it
anticipates unification, and the ROK Army's role in supporting the government. The
lessons learned from analyzing Germany and Yemen's unifications will be applied to the
issues confronting the ROK and DPRK governments. A table of possible actions the
ROK government should consider implementing will result from this comparison.
32
Endnotes
The Reader's Digest Treasury ofModern Quotations, New York, NY: Reader's Digest Press, 1975,
p.284.
2
It is important to note that Yemen's separation was cemented during the post-WW II Cold War period,
but the impetus for the division was a result of the early 1900's stalemate between two intrusive, non-Arab
empires: the Ottoman, then in occupation of Yemen, and the British, in Aden and the protectorates. Until
1967, when the U.K. withdrew form the region no Yemen authority had any input in the establishment of
Yemen's state boundaries. For a detailed accounting of Yemen history see Robert Stookey's, Yemen: The
Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic, pp. 1-5.
3 Woo Sik Kee, "The Path Towards a Unified Korean Economy," Korea and World Affairs . Vol. XV, No.




Kenneth N. Waltz, The Theory of International Politics, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1979, p. 3.
6 Woo Sik Kee, p. 23.
7 Kang Suk Rhee, "Korea's Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience," Asian Survey ,
Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, April 1993, pp. 361-362.
8






Ronald D. Asmus, "German Unification and Its Ramifications." RAND : R-4021-A, 1991, p. 61.
u
Charles Dunbar, the U.S. ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic from 1988 to 1990 and to the united
Republic of Yemen from 1990 to 1991, concisely summarizes the Yemen gradual unification process in
"The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects." The Middle East Journal : Vol. 46, No. 3.
Summer 1992, pp. 457-463. Former Ambassador Dunbar identifies the series of developments leading
up to Yemen unification as occurring in five diplomatic phases. Three phases occurred prior to 1988 and
two thereafter.
13
Baker Rebuffed By Yemeni Leader On U.N. Resolution. (1990, November 23). The Washington Post .
Gortemaker, p. 225.
Michael Collins Dunn, "Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen." Middle East Policy : Vol. 2, No. 2,
1993, p. 23. The author reports that Saudi Arabia feared a plot between Iraq, Jordan and Yemen to topple
the Kingdom of Saudi.
16
Dunbar, p. 470. The former Ambassador identifies that the Saudi government covertly assisted in
ensuring the status quo of Yemen separation by aiding Northern Yemen tribes opposed to the YAR.
33
Additionally, the Saudi' s encouraged these fierce tribes to oppose the Marxist government in South
Yemen, thus ensuring constant agitation to both the YAR and PDRY government's.







21 Giovanni de Briganti, "Bonn to Award Arms Disposal Pact." Defense News : August 31, 1992, p. 14.
The actual amount inherited was approximately 295,000 metric tons of munitions. Munitions included
small-arms, tank and antitank rounds, naval mines, artillery rounds, antitank missiles and artillery rockets.
Briganti reports from a telephonic interview with Ernst Niemeimer, German official in charge of
munitions-disposal program, that average cost for disposal range from $3.47 to .70 cents per metric ton,
depending on type of munitions.
22 Giovanni de Briganti, "Germans Seek Ammo Solution." Defense News : March 25, 1991, p. 1.






Briganti, "Germans Seek Ammo Solution." pp. 1-2. Briganti interviewed Wolfgang Burr, head of
international affairs at the German Ministry of Defense, and Burr stated, "Small quantities of other
equipment have been given away. The Russian Orthodox Church received 200 trucks, Romania was
given tents and clothing, while Egypt was provided with 30 SPW-40 nuclear/chemical warfare
reconnaissance vehicles to use in the Persian Gulf War." Thomas Lucey, Defense News Correspondent,
reports that Germany sold transportation vehicles and armored personnel carriers to Sweden, donated
carriers and clothing to Pakistan for Peacekeeping operations, and donated combat vehicles to
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, in "Germany Disposes East's Assets.", Defense News : March 13,
1995, p. 26.
27
Dunbar, p.462. The former ambassador notes that "... the general staffs were successfully integrated
into a unified defense ministry, and a few units were moved from south to north and vice versa.
Unification at the rank-and-file level, however, was left to take place over a protracted period of time, in
order not to sacrifice military efficiency." In Assem Abdel-Mohsen's report, "Yemen Army Insists it is
Politically Neutral." (1993, November 12), Reuters , he comments on the fact that military integration still
had not occurred as of 1993.
28 Chuck Schmitz, "Civil War in Yemen: The Price of Unity?" Current History: January 1995, p. 36.
29
Asmus, pp. 25-27. The German Economic and Monetary Union was established to implement, monitor




Gortemaker, pp. 142-146. Leif Roderick Rosenberger identifies this liberal conversion rate as the
"conversion mistake" that would be lamented in the years initially following unification in "How German
Unification Mistakes Damage West European Economies." Strategic Studies Institute: August 4, 1993,
pp. 3-4.
31 Asmus, p. 26.
32
Gortemaker, p. 231-232.
'The New Superpower." Newsweek : February 26, 1990, p. 23.
34Gregory F. Treverton and Barbara Bicksler, "Germany and the New Europe." Society : Vol. 29, No. 2,
January/February 1992, p. 50.
35
Gortemaker, pp. 231-232.
36 Schmitz, pp. 33-36.
37 Stephen C. Pelletiere, "Yemen and Stability in the Persian Gulf: Confronting the Threat from Within."
Strategic Studies Institute : May 22, 1996, p. 2.
38
Wright, Corey D. and Pinsker, Darren. "Republic of Yemen Undertakes the Daunting Task of Unifying
Two Disparate Economic and Political Systems." Business America: Vol. 113, No. 15/16. July 27, 1992,
p. 20.
39 Wright and Pinsker, p. 20.
40
Wright and Pinsker, pp. 20-2 1
.
41
Katherine M. Metres, "Yemen Again on Path to Democracy, Economic Growth." Washington Report
on Middle East Affairs : Vol. 15, No. 4, Oct 96, p. 70. Metres reports that by October 1996 the Republic
of Yemen had successfully completed the first stage of the World Bank/IMF economic reform program.
This positive step is cause for hope that after six years Yemen may be on the path to a free market
economy.
42
Klaus von Beyme, "Transition to Democracy - or Anschluss?" Government and Opposition : Vol. 25,
No. 2, Spring 1990.
43




Dunn, pp. 17-26. The author highlights an interesting fact that Islah was a coalition of Islamist and
tribal traditionalists, with its shrewd and hard-bargaining leader (Sheikh Abdallah Hussein al-Ahmar)
grounded more in tribal traditions than Islamic fundamentalism.
35
36
III. SIGNIFICANT UNIFICATION ISSUES CONFRONTING KOREA
"Predictions may be useful: The forces that propel two bodies headedfor a collision may
be inaccessible, but ifwe can predict the collision, we can at least get out of the way.
"
Kenneth W. Waltz, 1979
The government of a unified Korea will face many serious issues on the path to a
successful unification. With prior integrated planning and coordination perhaps more can
be accomplished that simply "... getting out of the way". What are the main unification
issues confronting the ROK government, and subsequent unified Korean government in
the future? What recommendations for action result if the lessons learned from Germany
and Yemen's unification are compared to the unification issues that confront Korea.
These are the questions I propose to answer in this chapter.
The magnitude of the problems confronting a newly unified Korean government
are daunting. Scholars have dedicated years, countless books and articles have been
written, and major conferences scheduled throughout the Asia-Pacific region predicting
the apocalyptic nature of the problems resulting from Korean unification. 1 Therefore it is
imperative to identify those problems that will naturally demand the full efforts of Korean
political leaders and unification planners. Similarly, identification and analysis of these
problems can allow the ROK government to preemptive planning. This preemptive
planning is essential to reducing the destabilizing internal and external factors
surrounding unification.
I contend that regional and domestic unification issues confronting the ROK
government include: unification diplomacy, regional disputes, the future of security
arrangements, economic and societal integration, and finally the destabilizing internal
environment in the north. Preemptive planning that identifies the stumbling blocks
inherent in each of these issues can assist the ROK government in addressing these
variables with successful countermeasures. Obviously a smooth road to unification is not
guaranteed, but the result of not considering countermeasures to identified problems is
sure disaster. This is not intended to represent an all-inclusive list of unification issues
confronting the ROK government.
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The variables affecting long-term infrastructure development are not analyzed
here. Although infrastructure development in the former DPRK will be important,
stabilizing the decaying situation in the North should occur first before a plan for
economic transition is initiate or the positive effects of long-term infrastructure projects
can be realized. This chapter consists of three sections.
Sections one and two analyze the regional and domestic unification issues
confronting the ROK government. This analysis results in decision-making insights to
assist the ROK government conduct preemptive unification planning. The concluding
section combines these decision-making insights, and lessons learned from German and
Yemen unifications to produce a table of recommendations for the regional and domestic
issues confronting Korea.
A. REGIONAL ISSUES
The armistice that halted the Korean War on July 27, 1953 set the stage for an
East Asian version of the Cold War in Europe. For over 40 years the DPRK and ROK
governments have balanced against each other both militarily and ideologically with the
help of the United States, the former Soviet Union and China. With the end of the Cold
War the two Koreas have faced a rapidly changing Asia-Pacific community.
Globalization and economic development have created a dynamic environment. A
unified Korean government faces the problem of implementing a foreign strategy which
interacts regionally as well as internationally. This strategy will be influenced by shaping
factors to include relations with the four major powers, regional disputes and alliances.
1. Diplomacy and The Four Major Powers
During the Cold War the balancing of superpowers with the two Korean states is
understandable since historically the Korean peninsula is one place where the interests of
China, Russia, Japan and the United States have intercepted and often collided. However
the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War in Europe has seen
the bilateral security alliances between the DPRK and Russia dissolve, and tempered the
DPRK-PRC relationship. Likewise the dissolution of support for the DPRK has created
an inter-South Korean debate questioning the logic of the ROK's continued security
38
umbrella with the United States. A brief analysis of the big four powers position in
relation to a unified Korea is helpful at this point.
a. China
China's concerns with a unified Korea are two-fold: (1) a large unified
Korean Army sharing a lengthy land border and (2) possibility of a western backed
ideological foe. If an antagonistic or lukewarm administration resulted in Korea
following unification, then China would be forced to alter its omni-directional strategy for
the future and focus on a more intense military modernization and buildup. China's
current reform strategy, is designed to promote economic prosperity in a drive to
transition from a command economy to a market economy with Chinese characteristics.
This drive has Beijing modernizing agriculture, industry, science, technology and defense
in what appears to be a successful drive to enter the global market place. 4 How does
China currently view the peninsula from a geopolitical perspective?
Today, China's focus on Korea perceives it as a security buffer between
China and Japan. China's current policy toward a unified Korea is based on continuation
of the status quo; two states one nation on the peninsula is in the interest of China.
China is not likely to stand idly by, and watch as the U.S. assists the ROK establish a
western-influenced unified Korea along the Yalu River. Predicting a response by China
to U.S. involvement is purely a speculative effort. However, some form of unilateral
effort by China to prevent North Korean refugees from pouring into China, while
securing North Korean provinces along the Yalu river to serve as a geographical buffer is
not unimaginable. This fact has the U.S. and ROK government's ensuring China's
participation in the current four-way talks between the two Koreas, the U.S. and China.
Besides the effort to guide the two Koreas on the road to unification, these talks ensure
transparency for all the nations involved. If a coalition effort to support the stabilization
of a unified Korea were to result, then perhaps this transparency could result in China's
participation in the effort. China's future stance toward a unified Korea is expected to
continue to reflect the pursuit of self-interest on China's part.
39
The future role of China in Korea may best be described as rapprochement
to create dependence. China's economic strategy focuses on engaging the ROK through
investment and technology transfer in China and creation of an open market for Chinese
goods while using the DPRK primarily as an export market for Chinese
goods.
6 As China struggles to enter the free market economy in a Chinese fashion it
reveals a unique understanding of targeting an audience by the different approaches used
to engage the DPRK and ROK. As China approaches the 21st Century the primary
concern is maintaining stability on its territorial periphery. Although not formally
acknowledging the desire for the status quo in a divided Korean peninsula this is the ideal
situation for China to further its economic and defense modernization goals. As Park
Soo-gil highlights, "Beijing is expected to continue its so-called 'no reunification, no
war' policy of maintaining the status quo (a divided Korea)".7
b. United States
The U.S. is at the forefront in promoting peaceful unification on the
peninsula. In 1997 the U.S. hosted two rounds of four power talks between both Koreas,
the U.S. and China. Although the talks were not able to move past the DPRK's excessive
demands for withdrawal of U.S. troops as a condition for further discussion, dialogue was
established and this is the critical first step toward the long awaited process of
establishing a true end to the Korean War. However supporting peaceful unification
does not necessarily mean the U.S. wants off the peninsula nor a lesser role in Korean
affairs.
With the end of the cold war the United States slowly enacted a national
security strategy for a new era. The United States national security strategy of engagement
and enlargement published in February 1996 describes three primary objectives: national
security, an integrated economic policy and to strengthen emerging democratic states.9
The Clinton administration continues envisioning the military as a forward presence
diplomacy tool that expresses U.S. commitment and an important deterrent against hostile
states. Considering the U.S. national security strategy, how does this strategy shape
relations with Korea in the future?
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Since the Korean war the United States has forward deployed a significant
military deterrent force in South Korea as a result of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty in 1954. Currently approximately 37,000 U.S. servicemen and women are serving
under three major commands in South Korea: United Nations Command, Combined
Forces Command and United States Forces Korea. 10 The U.S. has acknowledged it would
consider reducing U.S. forces on the peninsula for reciprocal reductions by North Korea.
However, a complete departure of U.S. forces, from a U.S. perspective, would not be in
the best interest of the U.S. and certainly against the 'forward deployed forces' aspect of
our security policy. The U.S. will likely not disappear from the peninsula overnight but
with nationalist sentiment on the rise in Korea, transition to a self-sufficient South
Korean military and possibility of unification causes one to ponder how long a permanent
U.S. presence will be required or tolerated.
As the United States looks to the future in Korea it is evident that the
administration is espousing to seek deep engagement in the economic sector while
maintaining the former bilateral security arrangement. However espousing and action are
two different things as Taylor and Kim astutely observe, "...while the United States is in
the region it is not part of the region and no matter how often the U.S. portrays itself as
the 'honest broker', what Asians know is brokers are not always investors." 11 The current
security alliance, forged from an unresolved war, will not fade overnight but a strong
economic trading partner (in Korea) can outlast a policy based on a anachronistic cold
war engagement policy.
c. Japan
Japan's policy toward Korea was consistent with the United States during
the Cold War, support for South Korea and rejection for North Korea. As the Cold War
ended, Japan reevaluated its policy toward the two Koreas. While still supporting the
ROK, Japan began experimenting with an open dialogue between North Korea and
Tokyo. Beginning with public acknowledgment of Japan's 'wrong war' in the Pacific,
Prime Minister Hosokawa sought to mend fences with South Korea while intensifying
efforts to engage Pyongyang. For both Koreas liquidating the past occupation period by
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Japan and payment for reparations are continuing thorny issues between all three states.
Time may help heal these thorny issues between Korea and Japan but forgiveness will not
likely result. For Japan the geostrategic utility of warm relations with Korea is critical
from a military security standpoint.
Security, in the form of defense, is one area where the peaceful
coexistence of the two Koreas is most advantageous to Japan. A South Korea backed by
the U.S. serves as a geostrategic buffer to a possible future hegemon in China. Japan
enjoys a situation where the U.S. is linked to both Seoul and Tokyo through security
alliances as well as American troops stationed in both countries. The security agreement
with the U.S. allows Japan to forego expensive military hardware procurement while
ensuring U.S. commitment through forward deployed troops. Japan realizes U.S. strategy
depends on forward presence and a unified Korea may question the need for U.S. troops
deployed in Korea.
Japan's need to maintain neighborly diplomatic relations with a unified
Korea is important. A unified Korea will possess a significant military power posited
approximately 150 miles Northwest of Japan. 13 Although a unified Korea does not in
itself pose a direct threat to Japan, Tokyo is not likely to be satisfied with a mainland
defense force if U.S. domestic pressure forces Washington to withdraw from the region
upon dissolution of a North Korean threat. In this sense the U.S. presence in Japan and
South Korea is seen as a viable balancing force that benefits Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and
the Pacific region in general.
d. Russia
As the Soviet Union dissolved into Russia and the surrounding
Confederation of Independent States, President Gorbachev focused on the internal aspects
of transitioning Russia's state controlled economy to a market based system. Like China,
Russia's bilateral cooperation with South Korea and cooling of relations with North
Korea is mainly based on trade and investment. However, unlike the PRC, Russia's
economic interest is one of desperation as it continues to rebuild from an abrupt end as a
Communist superpower, paradoxically thrust into the globalized free market system. 14 In
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a move that apparently recognized the ROK as the future core of a unified Korea, Russia
has sought engagement with the ROK in other areas.
Russia has engaged Seoul in direct military to military exchanges,
establishing the fact that Moscow is not taking a backseat in the region. Moscow and
Seoul have conducted military officer exchanges and in August 1993 a Russian naval
flotilla sailed into Pusan harbor for a goodwill tour. In addition, the two countries
conducted a joint naval exercise in 1997. 15 Moscow is spreading the tentacles of
engagement to include more than economic facets.
Russia's current policy toward Korea is not expected to change in the
future. The policy is entwined by three aspects: ensure the peninsula remains stable,
promote an orderly process for unification and expand economic relations with ROK.
Currently Korea is not a primary focus for the Russian state but the future appears to
entail deeper involvement. Although Northeast Asia currently ranks third in Russia's
foreign policy priorities, this ranking is not indicative of future overall importance. 1
Korea's current involvement in the region and with the four powers is an
outgrowth of post-Cold War security concerns and the new dimension of economic
engagement with former adversaries. This engagement is positive and in a large part due
to the security that alliances formed in the 1950's. As the two Korean states approach
unification relationships with the four powers and the diplomatic capability to mold a
strategy for the future will present a serious challenge for the new Korean state.
Additionally, regional disputes will certainly impose a serious diplomatic challenge for a
unified Korea.
2. Regional Disputes
Disputes in the sub-region are both territorial and a question of divided nations.
Territorially disputes include the Spratley Islands, Senkaku Islands, Takeshima/Tokto
Islands, and the contested border between China and Russia. 17 The Taiwan-PRC division
and possibility of future reconciliation currently takes a backseat to the North and South
Korea unification issue regionally. However the signal sent by China's show of military
force is that China intends to reunite Taiwan as part of China in the future. China's
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objective and Taiwan's determination to remain a separate state in the region is sure to
create future regional consternation.
18
Unlike the diplomatic transition of power between
Britain and China in Hong Kong, Taiwan may not be as smooth an acquisition for China.
A unified Korean government must take these regional disputes seriously when
formulating a strategy for the future. Taehyun Kim notes that these types of issues are
"...analogous to Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries". 19 The two World Wars
in Europe had as main issues of contention territorial disputes, containment and
expansionist goals of neighboring states. The desire to prevent a repeat of Europe's
World Wars should be the focus of consensus building among Asian states. As Kishore
Mahbubani states, "If the Asia-Pacific is to defy the historical odds and make a smooth
transition from one order to another, a new consensus must be forged soon."20 For a
future unified Korean government, their active participation in Asian diplomacy will
require a well developed strategy based on consensus building not isolationism. An
analysis of multilateralism in Asia upon Korean unification is timely here.
3. Security Agreements
As noted earlier security alliances in the Northeast Asia region have been bilateral
and a product of the Cold War. A unified Korea faces security decisions that can be
configured as bilateral, trilateral, multilateral or simply comprehensive security.
Comprehensive security allows the factors of diplomacy, the economy and military
defense an opportunity to provide security through countries interdependence with each
other. Currently in the region, economic multilateralism achieved through institutions
similar to Europe and track-two diplomacy efforts offer intermediate steps toward
achieving a more intertwined security environment.
The Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) is the primary multilateral economic
institution that has achieved success in ushering the Asian community into the global
marketplace. The hope that a multilateral security arrangement can produce the same
successful results created the preliminary dialogue in the form of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). In Northeast Asia, the ROK has initiated the Northeast Asia Security
Dialogue (NEASED), a possible step in the process to establish an institution for
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achieving transparency in defense issues. In view of the burgeoning arms race in East
Asia, it is apparent that economic multilateralism does not itself insure that all countries
feel secure (see Table 3-1). This 23.9% increase in East Asia arms procurement is an
alarming indicator of possible future conflict, especially when practically every other
region is decreasing arms procurement. To deter the possibility of armed conflict in East
Asia, the scope of multilateralism must broaden from a pure economic focus, and begin
including diplomatic and security consensus building among states.




Africa (all) 18.4 10.4 - 8.0%
Central America 3.3 1.0 -2.0
North America 339.0 299.9 -39.9
South America 19.7 16.1 -3.6
East Asia 120.9 144.8 + 23.9
South Asia 9.1 12.5 + 3.4
Middle East 99.4 45.1 -54.3
Europe (all) 634.9 299.8 -335.1
1989 expenditure value is an constant 1994 comparative value for accurate comparison
Source: Extracted from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, April 1996.), pp. 53-57.
Table 3-1. Regional Military Expenditures by Major Regions 1989-1995.
Although the ROK government is promoting multilateral security dialogue, the
results of the 1994 collaborative research by RAND and KTDA produced
recommendations that supported a continued Korean-U.S. bilateral security cooperation
into the next century.
22
It is unlikely that a unified Korean government, under primarily
ROK leadership, would abandon the security of the U.S. alliance in the near term
timeframe of unification. As Jin-Hyun Paik points out, "... the ROK has firmly
maintained that multilateralism is not a substitute for , but rather a supplement to,
bilateral arrangements."
23 The outcome of multilateral security efforts in Asia is an
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unknown entity in the coming years. No doubt that this issue will be a contentious one
facing a unified Korean government in the future.
A well planned foreign strategy for entering the region and the international
community is critical for a unified Korea. A well planned strategy, decisively
implemented is necessary to ensure that a unified Korea is not overwhelmed by
diplomatic regional pressures. Upon unification, Korea will not want to appear as a small
minnow between two big fish. As if the above mentioned problems were not enough, a
Korean government faces domestic economic and cultural issues upon unification that are
as boggling as the regional problems.
B. DOMESTIC ISSUES
The critical domestic issues inherent with Korean unification are the economics of
unification and the cultural dimension. A sound plan to address these domestic issues is
as vital as a sound foreign policy and regional approach during and after unification. If
these domestic issues are ignored it is highly probable that internal instability will result
on the peninsula. A short analysis establishes the breadth and relevance of these issues
for a unified Korea government.
1. Economic Integration
The economics of Korean unification are a complex issue. Complexities can be
grouped into two categories: the incompatibility of the two economic systems (capitalist
and command driven), and economic prosperity in the South versus complete stagnation
in the North. The two economic aspects of unification that require immediate attention
focused on long-term viable solutions are the financial cost associated with unification
and economic reforms.
a. Cost of Unification
Any attempt to accurately predict the cost of unification is fraught with
disaster. Analysts have settled on a figure of about US$ 1 trillion in the near term
required to successfully complete unification. 24 Although this figure may appear like an
educated guess that leaves the economic analysts room for safe maneuvering, it may be
surprisingly accurate. What if North Korea implements some form of economic reform?
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A 1994 study conducted by the Korean Development Institute addresses this issue, and
the cost is still staggering in a best-case North Korean economic reform scenario:
... If unification came in (the year 2000), and if the North had implemented some
form of economic liberalization similar to China, the ROK government would
have to invest about US$90 billion in the North during the next decade."5
The reality of DPRK economic liberalization is not optimistic. The North's "Free Trade
Zone" in Rajin-Sonbong (a region in its far Northeast province), is an isolated venture
that receives little support for expansion from within the government. 26 It is important to
note that the monetary cost of unification is not a one-time lump sum investment payment
that sets a unified Korea on the path to economic growth and prosperity. As Germany has
discovered after six years and about a half-trillion dollars invested on rebuilding the
former East Germany, the economy there remains stagnant. 27 The problem facing the
current ROK government now, and a unified Korean government in the future is how to
raise the money.
A financial strategy for unification must be developed by the ROK
government that addresses paying for North Korea's modernization, while establishing a
realistic timeline for reaching unified economic objectives. As a historical highlight West
Germany began pumping US$100 billion into East Germany beginning in 1990. This
staggering amount of money indicates the requirement for South Korea to develop a
funding vehicle now. Kyongsoo Lho clearly articulates the political symbolism of a
unification fund and how South Korea, through conservative taxation, could raise
US$2,475 billion in the first year. Substantively and as a symbol this fund would
assuage financial anxiety regionally and internationally during the initial period of
unification. Additionally, this unification fund can work across the broad range of
unification scenarios as a staggering monetary price tag is a certain variable regardless of
how Korea arrives at unification. A relevant question to analyze is: how financially
prepared for unification is South Korea?
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b. Economic Reforms
Economic analysts have identified that the ROK economic system requires
some major economic reforms. Obviously these reforms and time for implementation,
are desired prior to undergoing unification. In diagnosing the South Korean economy
Chung Un-chan addresses both the short-term macroeconomic indicators and the long-
term structural perspective to render this statement of the fundamental problem:
absence of firmly established rules for economic activities, the "survival of the
strongest," rather that the fittest, has become the rule as businesses are obsessed
with making easy money through rent-seeking activities rather than in efficient
economic activities.30
The bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel in 1997 and the subsequent fallout throughout the ROK
economic and political sectors is a prime example of this fundamental problem. 31
The task of economic reform is monumental. Jinn Tae-hong further
expands on a diagnosis of the ROK economy and comments that, "Any financial reform
(in ROK) should establish a substructure that will enable the financial market to monitor
business firms and deal with noncompetitive businesses in a self-regulating manner." 3
Additionally Jinn Tae-hong proposes three major tasks required to move the ROK
economy toward reform: (1) Deregulation of financial institutions; (2) A system of
accountability for financial institutions; and (3) Upgrading the financial system to
improve monitoring. 33
These economic reforms and aggressive implementation of a unification
fund are major issues for the current ROK and future unified Korean government. The
issue of long-term cultural assimilation is the final problem I propose that will require the
concentrated efforts of the Korean political leaders and government institutions.
2. Societal Integration
This aspect of unification does not receive the extensive coverage that other
unification issues do, but it is nonetheless a critical long-term integration factor. Any
unifying nation must consider the assimilation of its society if it expects to remain a
stable lasting state. In accordance with the societal integration theory of Deutsch and
Haas, homogenous reconciliation of two opposing societies - in total - must be achieved
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in the long term for successful unification.
34
Nicholas Eberstadt, the respected scholar of
Korea adds, "Reunification without assimilation is not worth the name." 3 ' Although
Korea is culturally homogenous, integration may be difficult.
a. Indicators of Trouble
The history of the Korean peninsula is a good indicator that societal
problems may arise upon unification. Following over five decades of separation resulting
from a fratricidal war, a deep-seated mistrust between the two states is evident. The
depth that this mistrust extends beyond government rhetoric is not measurable, however
the message is rooted in both government's propaganda campaigns. 36 A foundation for
this mistrust and antagonism is the two states differing political ideologies that only assist
in alienating their homogenous populations from each other. A final indicator of
problems is simply the inferiority complex that is likely to arise among the people in the
North upon unification. Due to the North's closed society the peoples of the DPRK may
feel bitter when discovering their brethren were prospering while they suffered oppression
and famine brought on by decades of poor governmental management. The effects of
these issues may be considerable.
b. Anticipated Problems
The cultural problems resulting from unification may cause the two
societies to clash in a manner analogous to their contending armies. Similar to West
German resentment, former ROK residents are likely to resent the long-term taxes
required to fund unification and infrastructure development in the North. As mentioned
above, North Koreans are likely to resent South Koreans for not forcing their government
to negotiate unification earlier or for not providing aid and assistance to the North
because of ideological differences. Both societies are likely to feel alienation toward the
other. In the North this alienation may take the form of extreme nationalism and this
problem can create havoc for a fledgling unified government attempting to unify a
society.
37
The Problem of cultural assimilation will require a comprehensive long-
term plan that phases the aspects of integration gradually to ensure complete assimilation
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of all peoples. Intertwined in the issue of Korean societal integration is the problem of a
destabilizing environment in the north. The methods and efficiency a unified Korean
government displays during resolution of stability and support operations in North Korea
is a first step in the societal integration process.
3. Stability and Support Operations
Stabilizing the internal situation in North Korea is a critical step to ensuring
successful unification for the people of Korea and their new government. Major stability
and support operations in North Korea will consist of military restructuring, humanitarian
assistance and displaced personnel management. Compared to Germany and Yemen,
these internal problems are monumental, and pose the greatest threat to destabilizing the
Korean government during the early stages of the unification process. There is no easy
solution to these issues. Each operation is expensive to resolve, requires a long range
plan, and is manpower intensive. Military restructuring depends on how unification
results, and the political decisions made to determine the size of a unified Korean military
force. Displaced personnel management is necessary to prevent a potentially chaotic
situation from seriously impeding the unification process. Planning for long-term
humanitarian assistance operations in the north will be required to offset the many years
of deprivation due to a socialist driven economy. An in-depth analysis of these stability
and support operations will be conducted in the following chapter.
C. CONCLUSION
From the analysis of the regional and domestic problems confronting a unified
Korean government, what actions should the current ROK government be taking to
reduce post-unification chaos on the peninsula? The lessons learned from the German
and Yemen unification processes (see Table 2-5), can assist in answering this question.
Table 3-2 represents possible recommendations and/or preemptive actions the ROK
government should consider implementing in order to reduce the level of destabilization
that may result from these issues.
For Korea, the four-way talks must result in concrete agreements that are phased
in over time, and commit the governments of North and South Korea to unification by
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and through the will of the people. The four-way talks may only set the groundwork for
further diplomacy that resolves more immediate inter-Korean problems of unification.
This phased process should not be hurried and gradual setbacks are certain. The most
important facet is that all major issues are resolved prior to an official unification
announcement. The resulting unified Korean government should embrace some form of
collective security to allow for more decision-making latitude in the international and
regional forums. South Korea and the United States should mutually develop courses of
action for modifying their bilateral security agreement depending on how unification
results, and the tone of the current four-way talks. It is better to discuss modifying the
agreement before either side is forced to do so in the final phases of unification. The
economic integration will likely be destabilizing in the short-term, and a long-term vision
is required to offset possible economic disillusionment within Korean society. South
Korea should plan for a worst-case military demobilization of the north. This plan should
address the actual process as well as the financial burden this worst-case scenario
imposes. Finally, preparing each state's societies is an absolutely critical step in the
unification process. At a minimum, South Korea should begin preparing its citizens for
the realities and long-term commitment associated with unifying Korea.
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Regional Issues Preemptive Planning Recommendations
Diplomacy Process 1
.
Avoid officially unifying until all major issues between ROK and
DPRK are resolved;
2. Diplomacy process must focus on the two Korea's, while resolving
potential conflict issues among the major powers;
3. Incorporate confidence building measures in phases, to include: arms
reductions, societal exchanges, and economic reforms;
Regional Disputes 1. Resolve those disputes directly involving a unified Korea during the
diplomatic process;
2. A unified Korea should practice short-term conflict avoidance;
Security Agreements 1 Seek foreign policy decision-making flexibility through a multilateral
framework;
2. Avoid bilateral security agreements that commit a unified Korea to
participate in another country's conflict;
3. Broaden current U.S.-ROK security agreement by assuming more
direct control, but do not abandon U.S. in the short-term period;
4. Ensure Korea's security agreement choice is thoroughly understood by
the major powers during the diplomacy process;
Domestic Issues
Economic Integration 1. ROK government must establish a unification fund: pay a little now or
a lot later;
2. ROK should seek regional donations for the unification fund: prevent
regional economic destabilization;
3. ROK government should implement economic reform designed to
strengthen the entire financial sector, while the DPRK can begin to
reform their economic system following China's model




Prepare the people in each society for harsh realities of unification;
2. Focus of long-term plan should stress a "go-slow" approach that
downplays the early euphoria and emphasizes the costs
Stability and Support
Operations
1 Develop a plan to reduce these destabilizing DPRK internal factors;
2. Future insurrections are the cost for ignoring these factors;
3. Plan should focus on a Korean led interagency effort cooperative
long-term effort;
Prior to unification, deconflict regional and international assistance in
conducting these operations.
Table 3-2. German and Yemen Lessons Learned Applied to Korean Unification
The table primarily addresses action on the part of the ROK government prior to
unification. However, unification in this situation is a multilateral process that will
require patience, understanding and negotiations in good faith by each state, and the
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major powers involved. Whether the DPRK government is seeking valid economic
reform and adjustment of its state-driven policies is still debatable. What is not debatable
is the continued hard-line stance projected by the DPRK political and military elites still
in power. The DPRK's non-compromising stance displayed during preliminary four-
power talks does not bode well for future confidence building measures enroute to a
phased gradual unification. With the DPRK regime's lack of international political and
global economic experience, these preemptive planning recommendations are seemingly
focused at the ROK government. The next chapter conducts an in-depth analysis of the
domestic issue of stability and support operations in North Korea, and the critical role I
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IV. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS: THE ROK ARMY'S ROLE
"As you see I am here. I am alive.
"
Kim Jong D, October 1997 1
The previous chapter outlined the major problems and issues confronting a unified
Korean government. The stability and support operations in North Korea upon
unification was a serious domestic issue highlighted that may produce a destabilizing
situation for the new government. This chapter addresses questions surrounding these
operations. What are the scope of the stability and support operations in North Korea?
How can the ROK Army assist the government in conducting these SASO missions?
What role should the ROK Army play in conducting these operations? Answering these
questions can assist a unified Korean government in formulating a plan to successfully
implement stabilizing measures in North Korea upon unification. The limitations of
analyzing the situation in North Korea are addressed next.
Due to North Korea's closed society and the tendency to withhold critical
statistics and data the analysis of issues confronting the ROK Army and the new Korean
government is a difficult task. Published data and reports are viewed skeptically due to
the propensity of the Kim Jong-D government to skew data and statistics for the purpose
of proving that Juche ideology is a successful concept in today's interdependent world.
To establish the population and density in North Korean I focused on the U.S. Census
Bureaus' International database, a 1987 Library of Congress research study on North
Korean population, and Nicholas Eberstadt's thorough research on North Korean
population conducted in 1992. I derived 1997 mid-year population estimates by
extrapolating Eberstadt's data using a conservative population growth of 1.8%." This
population analysis enhanced and provided the analytic portion required to dissect the
scope of the refugee problem. The primary reference for analysis of North and South
Korean military capability is the recently published South Korean Defense White Paper:
1996-1997. The scope of the humanitarian assistance effort required in the North was
primarily established through the recent daily reports by the International Red Cross and
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numerous NGOs and PVOs reporting on conditions within North Korea. Defining the
military restructuring issue required assumptions.
In order to properly frame the restructuring problem I have made the following
assumptions: (1) in a short-of-war unification scenario, a phased plan to transition the
military will be implemented; (2) the final outcome of this transition plan establishes a
unified Korean military sized at 570,000 personnel;' and (3) similar to the Bundenswehr's
decision-making process, only the newest or best maintenance capable combat systems
will be retained. These assumptions are based on their being no arms reductions between
the two Koreas in association with confidence building measures during the diplomatic
process. Arms reductions prior to military restructuring will only assist the overall effort.
These realistic assumptions allow us to grasp the scope of the problem. The inter-Korean
bureaucratic process of handling issues in North Korea requires discussion.
An understanding of the Korean governmental focus toward North Korea upon
unification highlights some issues for discussion. The government in Seoul established
the ROK Ministry of National Unification (MNU) to develop policy and plans for
unification of the Korean peninsula. Part of the MNU planning is focused on post-
unification activities in the former North Korea. However, this focus primarily directed
toward reprogramming North Korean society to facilitate transition and interaction with
the people in the South. The successful execution of the stability and support operations
analyzed in this chapter can be an integral first step on the road to achieving MNU's
objective. Therefore, coordination between the MNU and MND will be essential to
ensure that an overall Korean solution to stabilizing the situation in North Korea is
developed. The stability and support operations analyzed in this chapter are best viewed
as short-term elements of an overall plan. Successful resolution of these elements will
require integrated planning and coordination among civilian-military institutions, but an
efficiently structured and highly capable organization like the ROK Army is best suited to
handle the SASO missions outlined.
I conclude that the Korean government will quickly task the ROK Army to handle
perhaps the three most important short and long-term stabilizing issues facing a unified
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Korea: (1) military restructuring, (2) humanitarian relief operations in the North, and (3)
displaced personnel management.
5
If not handled effectively and with great care, these
personnel intense issues could severely prolong or, even worse, subvert successful
attempts at Korean unification.
6 The ROK Army is a highly disciplined and effective
organization capable of handling many-faceted problems. For the past 40 years it has
developed and adopted many of the planning and decision-making procedures used by the
United States military. These staff procedures are characterized by the ability to conduct
mission analysis, identify and target critical aspects of the operation, plan for and allocate
appropriate resources and publish timely orders for subordinates to execute. 7 This
chapter consists of four sections.
Sections one, two and three are an in-depth analysis of the SASO missions I
contend will be delegated to the ROK Army: military restructuring, humanitarian
assistance operations, and displaced personnel management. This analysis presents the
scope of the problems as well as recommendations and ideas for successfully
implementing a plan of stabilization for each mission. The concluding section
summarizes my recommendations for conducting each mission successfully. This
summary of recommendations will be used in developing the U.S. Army Special Forces
framework for employment in the following chapter.
A. MILITARY RESTRUCTURING
Military restructuring of the combined ROK and DPRK militaries will require
exhaustive planning, flexible execution, and entail a team effort between the military
leaders of each country. This subsection will define the scope of the problem and
consolidation issues, analyze the question of an integrated military, discuss disposal of
DPRK conventional ground combat systems and ammunition, and identify the main
missions confronting the ROK Army.
1. Scope of the Problem and Consolidation
A combined Korean armed force would be the 3rd largest military in the world
and certainly create a destabilizing factor for regional diplomacy. 8 Similar to the situation
faced by the West German Bundenswehr, the ROK Army must recommend to their
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unified government what type and size of military is required to support the government's
domestic and foreign policy. At a minimum a unified Korea will desire a sufficient
defense force capable of protecting its sovereign rights as a nation and a peacekeeping
contingent to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide.9 Appendix A
shows a combined ROK/DPRK military force of 1.7 million personnel in strength,
equipped with an excess of combat systems, albeit not compatible. It is easy to predict
that restructuring will be required.
The assumption that a unified Korean military force will primarily be equipped
with the latest technology and best maintainable weapon systems helps define the weapon
downsizing issue. Unlike the former East Germany, the North Korean forces have
comparatively outdated Warsaw Pact weapon systems. Table 4-1 details the major
combat systems of the North Korean military, and with the exception of Surface to Air
missiles, Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL), and possibly support aircraft, the majority of
the DPRK major military combat systems are outdated.
Ground Forces Air Forces
Tanks: Tactical Fighters:
4
T54AT55fT59 2,750 MIG 23/29 60
T62 800 MIG 19/21
T34 250 SU-7/25 460
MIG 15/17 320
Armored Fighting Vehicles:




MRL 2,7002 Ml -26 290
AA Guns 12,500
Surface to Air Missiles:
SA series 3303
1
Includes 76.2/100/122/130/152/170 mm Howitzers and artillery weapon systems.
2
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL) include 107/122/132/240 mm weapon systems.
3
Includes the SA-3, SA-2 and long-range SA-5.
4
North Korea considers their Advanced Fighters to be MIG 23/29; Mainstay Fighters
to be the MIG 19/21 and the SU series.
Source: data extracted from Korean Defense White Paper, 1996-1997.
Table 4-1. North Korean Major Military Ground and Air Combat
Systems
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These outdated systems are hindered by maintenance and spare parts issues
similar to those faced by the Bundeswehr. A unified Korean government will need to
decide on how best to dispose of over 3800 tanks, 2800 armored fighting vehicles, 20,800
artillery systems (howitzers and AA guns), 840 tactical fighters and 290 helicopters.
Once a decision on disposal is made the ROK Army will need to develop and implement
a plan for disposal. The first step in disposal may be the most challenging, the
consolidation of combat systems.
2. Consolidation of Combat Systems











Source: North Korea, A County Study, 1994.
Figure 4-1. North Korean Combat Unit Deployment Posture
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may assist in the consolidation of major ground and air combat systems. Approximately
65% of the DPRK's military forces are postured south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. 10
Figure 4-1 details the ROK Ministry of National Defense military analysts suggestion of
four assault corridors leading into the South and the 1 1 North Korean Corps currently
postured south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.
This posturing formation can be beneficial to ROK Army initial efforts during the
consolidation process. The ROK Army can plan tentative courses of action for
consolidation based on the offensive and logistics support plans required to execute the
North Korean attack plan. By encouraging a withdrawal type maneuver by DPRK forces,
the ROK Army can consolidate by attack corridor 65% of the North Korean ground
forces, combat systems and accompanying logistics. Similarly, incorporating North
Korean unit commanders in a review of the planned consolidation effort can enhance this
effort. This maneuver is not designed to push North Korean forces back, but rather to
extract them from their offensive stance and assemble them in the rear area. These
assembly sites will reduce tension and facilitate accountability and consolidation efforts.
Finally, organized assembly sites offer an excellent starting point for disposal of
conventional combat systems and accompanying ammunition.
3. Disposal of DPRK Combat Systems and Ammunition
A unified Korean government faces some complicated issues in reference to
disposal of excess military combat systems and ammunition. Adding to the increasing
arms race in Southeast Asia by transferring the equipment and accompanying ammunition
to other nations via either sales or aid will likely create tension within the region.
Moreover, transporting the military equipment by sea is a more burdensome proposal
than that faced by Germany. Likewise, destroying the combat systems and exorbitant
stockpiles of associated ammunition will create a financial burden that is excessive for
the Korean government to absorb. However, destroying the systems and ammo is an
option, and may be supported by the major powers.
A possible course of action for a unified Korea is to sell the most advanced North
Korean military hardware (including support assets), to the PRC or back to the Russians,
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and offer a small percentage of the older systems to other countries in the Asian theater.
This disposal solution creates some pertinent issues, and has some constraints. Adding
bargain priced combat systems to the expanding Asian arms procurement problem will
create some tension with the U.S. and the United Nations. The Koreans would likely
accept some diplomatic backlash in face of the enormous disposal problem. In this
instance the U.S. may step in and offer to take the older North Korean combat systems for
use as Opposing Force (OPFOR) equipment at the U.S. National Training Center. Money
to pay for systems and China's military modernization is a constraint to selling excess
systems. Russia is currently too financially strapped to consider purchasing systems, and
China's modernization limits the amount of equipment they would consider purchasing.
The initial phase of consolidation and the follow-on disposal of combat systems offers the
opportunity to begin implementing the integration of ROK/DPRK military personnel as
they work together to consolidate North Korea's military systems and ammunition for
disposal. This inter-Korean military cooperation is the first step toward an integrated
military force and a reduction in cultural tension.
4. An Integrated Military
As mentioned previously, the consideration for an integrated military force upon
unification is likely to occur only if unification is achieved short of war. In light of this
scenario it is prudent that consideration be given to the development and implementation
of a personnel downsizing plan designed to reduce the 1 .7 million military personnel
combined force by approximately 1.1 million. 11 Many of these personnel can be used in
the initial security and transition phases of the military institutions as they downsize.
However at some point the phasing of military personnel back to civilian life must begin.
It is this transition phase that may create problems in readjustment and unemployment.
The most important aspect of this issue is to have a plan prepared for
implementation. As we saw in the German unification example, the Bundeswehr
published and began implementation of a personnel downsizing immediately. This
timely action quelled many military personnel's anxieties and prevented elapsed time that
may have created antagonistic feelings. In contrast, the Yemen example provides insight
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to the disaster of allowing two separate militaries to remain intact following unification.
In North Korea, the possible influence of former political elites on a non-integrated force
may ferment future conflict between the two forces as occurred in Yemen.
5. WMD in the North
In 1994 the Nuclear Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea
officially recognized the international community's concern about the technologically
advanced state of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. For decades South Korea and
the international community has monitored North Korea's efforts to transition nuclear
power capabilities and technology to a weapons program. 13 Whether the North has
actually produced a deliverable nuclear weapon is questionable, but hardly the point of
the matter. The fact remains that the North has research, design and testing facilities for
development of a nuclear weapons program, and production and storage facilities for its
formidable chemical weapons program.
Since the early 1960's North Korea has emphasized chemical weapons.
According to the Korean Defense White Paper, "It (North Korea) has so far produced and
stockpiled, in large quantity, such gas agents as blister gas, nerve gas, blood agent and
tear gas."
14
Figure 4-2 represents both the chemical and nuclear facilities that are
currently operational in North Korea. For the ROK Army these storage sites, facilities and
research institutions are likely to present one of the main security operations delegated
during the unification process.
The implied task for the ROK Army in a security mission of these chemical and
nuclear locations is the accountability and continuous physical control of these weapons
to prevent proliferation and pilferage. A phased approach focusing on the six chemical
weapon storage sites first, followed by the production facilities and finally the security of
the research institutions is a plausible plan for consideration (see Figure 4-2). Again, an
integrated ROK/DPRK military effort in accomplishing these security and control
missions assist the goal of military integration, while providing a higher degree of
cooperation and disclosure.
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Once secured, both military organizations have the manpower and capability within









Source: Korean Defense White Paper, 1996-1997.
Note: Due to source and security classification, exact locations are not represented.
Figure 4-2. North Korean Chemical and Nuclear Facilities Locations
disposing of the materials in accordance with a unified government's plan.
What if a unified Korean government decided to maintain a portion of these
chemical stocks or exploit DPRK nuclear research? The chemical and nuclear weapons
issue is very sensitive, and requires the major powers to understand the vulnerability a
unified Korean government may feel initially. It is likely that the world community will
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require an official accounting and explanation of any Korean plan to maintain chemical
stocks. Likewise, a unified Korean government planning to exploit any nuclear research
or weapons developed by the DPRK will probably result in disapproval from the U.S. and
China. The best approach is one that ensures security of these weapons of mass
destruction while diplomatically negotiating the final disposition. The major powers may
have to accept that in the short term a newly unified Korean government feels more
secure having direct influence over these weapons. The next major problem that the
ROK Army may find itself involved in is managing displaced persons.
B. DISPLACED PERSONNEL
The macro-level problem lies in the ratio of land mass to population density and
encompasses both space and economic issues of unemployment. South Korea has over
45 million people occupying some 98,000 square kilometers of land, while North Korea
has almost 24 million people in an expanse over 120,000 square kilometers. 15 A simple
inspection reveals a 1:2 ratio of people to square kilometer (sq.km.) of land in the south
compared to a 1:5 ratio in the North. However the fact that both North and South Korea
have become predominately urban highlights the real issue. The urban centers in South
Korea cannot employ and house a mass flow of North Korean refugees upon
unification.
16
Controlling refugees requires understanding the scope of the problem, and
anticipating the egress routes refugees might use in order to aid planning the positioning
of refugee centers.
1. Scope of the Problem
An analysis of the North Korean civilian population allows a determination of
population densities, a key variable for analysis of the refugee problem. Appendix B
details the civilian population estimates and density of persons per square kilometer for
the nine provinces, three municipalities and twenty major cities comprising North
Korea. Analysts predict a mass influx of approximately one million refugees in the
immediate days following an absorption or collapse unification scenario. 18 These
personnel will primarily flow from the southern provinces and municipalities of
Kangwan, Kaesong, and North Hwanghae (see Figure 4-3). In order to further analyze
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Source: "The Population of North Korea," Center for Korean Studies: UC Berkeley,
1992.
Note: Arrows indicating egress routes of displaced personnel are the author's contention.
Figure 4-3. North Korean Provinces and Predicted Displaced Personnel Flow
the problem an assumption on the percentage of personnel expected to flee North Korea
is mandatory.
Expanding on analysts' predictions of one million displaced personnel and the
current famine and drought in North Korea a conservative value of 5.5% was determined
for the percentage of population that will displace upon unification.
19
Applying this
percentage to population data from Appendix B results in the expected number of
refugees per province or municipality as shown in Table 4-2.
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Province or Municipality Population Displaced Personnel
Kangwan 1,448,000 79,640
Kaesong 391,000 21,505
South Hwanghae 2,259,000 124,245
North Hwanghae 1,163,000 63,965
Nampo 844,000 46,420
Pyongyang 2,779,000 152,845
South Pyongyan 3,131,000 172,205
North Pyongyan 2,841,000 156,255
Chagang 1,364,000 75,020
Yanggang 741,000 40,775
South Hamgyong 3,006,000 165,330
North Hangyong 2,364,000 130,020
Total 1,228,205
Table 4-2. North Korean Displaced Personnel Estimate
Having defined the refugee problem in an analytical sense, we now turn to a qualitative
analysis of egress routes out of North Korea to further frame the problem.
2. Displaced Personnel Egress Routes
The primary methods for refugees fleeing North Korea are by land and by sea.
North Korea shares three land borders. The border with China is by far the longest at
1,416 kilometers; the border with South Korea at the DMZ is 238 kilometers, and the
border with Russia is only 19 kilometers. 20 Refugees fleeing by land are constrained by
North Korea's rugged geography and this assists in the ability to template the flow of
refugees by land access routes. The previously mentioned North Korean military attack
corridors into South Korea are designed to take advantage of the only passageways
between the mountain ranges laying perpendicular to the DMZ. These four attack
corridors can serve as refugee control points and establish a focal point for analyzing
placement of refugee centers to reduce mass refugee flow into South Korea through the
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DMZ. However care must be taken to avoid appearing non-hospitable, as Nicholas
Eberstadt states, "Neither North or South Koreans will favorably view a continued sort of
DMZ (as a means) to control migration." The land egress routes into China are less
constrained and in view of the long history of association across their borders it is certain
a large percentage of refugees from the bordering provinces will flee into China. Refugee
egress by sea offers a viable alternative.
The number of refugees fleeing by sea to South Korea and Japan will be
constrained by the quantity of private vessels available but these refugees create an
opportunity for media exposure of how the government in Seoul is handling the displaced
persons situation. This aspect is critical but not in direct control of the ROK Army's
efforts and will not be addressed further. However, the ROK Army's initial efforts at
controlling displaced personnel flow throughout North Korea may help alleviate some of
the expected North Korean "boat people" by reducing the desire to flee in the first place.22
We now turn to the establishment of displaced personnel centers in North Korea.
3. The ROK Army and Displaced Personnel Centers
The method for controlling a North Korean mass exodus into South Korea is to
identify displaced personnel center placement locations to reduce the flow by eliminating
the immediate desire to flee. Identifying major urban areas and calculating movement
rates of personnel on foot are the main variables used here to identify tentative locations.
It is important to note that 40% of the North Korean civilian population live within five
walking days of the DMZ. 23 The goal of displaced personnel center placement in the
short term is to stabilize the situation by preventing the mass displacement of personnel
from consolidating along the borders. Additionally, it must be established that these
displaced personnel centers are not designed to provide a permanent living arrangement
or replace the homes of displaced North Koreans. These placement and sizing factors
will be used to assist in analyzing placement of displaced personnel centers.
A macro level plan for placement of displaced personnel centers might look
somewhat like that presented in Figure 4-4. This hypothetical macro plan calls for
establishing nine DP centers in three Populace Control sectors. The sectors identified are
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based on the provincial DP estimates detailed in Table 4-2, and highlighted in Figure 4-3.
Placement of DP centers in sector one focuses on the egress routes leading to the DMZ,
and establishes a major DP center along each route. These centers are designed to control
those displaced personnel from the high population density areas in sector one from
flowing into the DMZ. Placement of centers in sectors two and three are linked to
personnel routes of movement and placed near major population centers. These centers
are designed to prevent the massing of personnel toward the DMZ. As evident, this DP










Figure 4-4. Displaced Personnel Center Placement in North Korea
To show the manpower intensity of this operation, consider that once established,
it would require one battalion of soldiers to provide security and insure orderly operation
of each refugee center. This would entail over nine battalions in the initial phase. The
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missions these military units might conduct focuses on providing security for the non-
governmental agencies providing relief, safeguarding materials and components of aid
from pilferage, and maintaining order within the DP centers. 24 These nine battalions are
inclusive of the refugee centers and do not include the logistical units required to support
the battalions or activities of the DP centers. Similarly, humanitarian assistance required
within North Korea upon unification encompasses the displaced personnel as well as
broader areas of assistance.
C. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
This aspect is best viewed as the ROK Army's short-term contribution to the
government's long-term nation-building plan in the North. In North Korea's situation
this is especially relevant as over 50 years of socialist style centralized planning has
resulted in an outdated national infrastructure. Unfortunately, when dealing with a
formerly closed society the infrastructure decay assessment process will require time to
determine what can be done and when. The nation-building effort will require in depth
planning and execution at the governmental level. Meanwhile immediate assistance will
be required for humane purposes and the ROK Army should plan to lead the effort. The
ROK Army's primary focus should be on those short-term humanitarian tasks designed to
stabilize and provide comfort to the people of North Korea. These tasks will primarily
include control and distribution of food and medical aid throughout North Korea.
Unfortunately, unless North Korea opens up to reveal the real extent of infrastructure
decay and allows combined inspections to initiate precise planning, analysis is limited to
educated appraisals.
1. Scope of the Problem
North Korea's chronic food shortage has been both a systems and environment
problem. A shortage of arable land (18%), poor harvests due to floods and drought, and a
cumbersome distribution system have all contributed to a desperate situation for the 17
million persons relaying on government rations for survival." The highly publicized
appeal for food aid on North Korea's behalf in early 1995 was a red flag indicating self-
sufficiency inadequacies and deteriorating conditions approaching famine proportions.
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The latest reports from the World Food Programme, International Red Cross and several
private volunteer organizations (PVOs) indicate that 800,000 tons of food is required to
prevent the starvation of an estimated five million North Koreans before the October
1997 harvest.
27
It is important to note that with current drought conditions, and an
expected crop shortfall of 2.6 million tons of grain for 1997 the requirement for food aid
will likely extend for several years.
28
If unification occurs prior to the food shortage
problem receding, then the medical and mental deficiencies resulting from chronic
malnourishment will require immediate attention.
Chronic malnourishment yields a variety of medical problems. Chief among them
is anemia, including iron, protein and carbohydrate deficiency. 29 Severe anemia results
in a conspiracy between malnutrition and infection, creating a vicious cycle where the
body requires more nutrients to fight off increasing infections. 30 The infections, aided by
starvation, finally override the body's immune system resulting in death. The diagnosis of
the malnutrition problem in North Korean children has been the focus of many aid
organizations and medical experts ventures into North Korea. Dr. Milton Amayun, a
physician specializing in humanitarian emergencies, stated on his return from North
Korea in July 1997, "He saw groups of schoolchildren who showed serious signs of
stunted growth ... a sure sign of chronic malnutrition."31 Dr. Amayun further details the
gravity of the malnutrition situation by adding that daily food rations are down to several
ounces of rice per person. " Kathy Zwelleger, of the Caritas Aid Agency, commented on
returning from her tenth trip into North Korea, "One school teacher told me five children
had died at her small school since the last floods in 1996 ... I saw hungry children too
weak to stand and hospital incapable of feeding patients." 3 This malnourishment
problem will require immediate aid while long-term food production and distribution
adjustments are instituted during the nation-building process.
2. ROK Army's Role
The ROK Army has the support and logistical units to assist in the delivery of
critical supplies to suspend the human suffering. However, having the support assets is
only part of the issue. Coordination between the ROK Army and the multitude of GO,
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NGO and PVO's that will require assistance of vehicles and personnel to move and
administer aid is a critical factor. The ROK Army will not only have to provide critical
support assets for conducting HA missions, but will have to manage their support assets,
while deconflicting numerous competing requirements, and coordinating well-intentioned
organizations.
D. CONCLUSION
Regardless of where or when Korean unification occurs along the spectrum of
unification, whether through war or the many short-of-war scenarios, the ROK Army can
contribute significantly in stabilizing the situation in the North. Through the conduct of
Stability and Support operations in the North, the ROK Army will allow the Korean
government to direct and provide guidance for stabilizing the North, while retaining the
required attention to handle the international and other domestic issues that threaten to
overwhelm a newly unified government. Table 4-3 summarizes the ideas and
recommendations for consideration by the ROK Army during conduct of these SASO
missions.
Developing an integrated planning process for Stability and Support operation
efforts between the ROK Army and ROK MNU is an important inter-Korean step toward
the effective application of government assets to tackle the problem of stabilizing the
North. Lack of integration in planning will result in loss of efficiency during execution.
This non-integration will affect every detail of mission execution from deploying
specialists and units, to providing sufficient logistical and support assets for successfully
conducting the missions. For the ROK Army conducting Stability and Support operations
in North Korea is a definite 180° degree inverse of their current warfighting focus. How
can the United States Army help the Korean Army in the transition from warfighting to
stability operations? The next chapter addresses how the U.S. Army Special Forces can
be employed to assist the ROK Army in accomplishing the objective of stabilizing the
North following unification.
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WMD accountability and control through a sequentially based
security plan focusing on storage sites, facilities and research centers
2. Security of conventional combat systems is critical
3. ROK Army leaders develop detailed plan for consolidation and
disposal of combat systems/ammo based on civilian leaders guidance
4. ROK Army commanders should be prepared to negotiate one-on-one
with DPRK Corps commanders along the DMZ
Displaced Personnel
Management
5. Pre-plan locations of DP centers throughout the depth of North
Korea to prevent mass exodus of personnel
6. Ensure DP centers do not become permanent homes for North
Koreans
7. Plan for manpower intensity
8. ROK Army commanders should be prepared to work with PVO, GO
and NGO's; while realizing the influence of the media
Humanitarian
Assistance
9. Focus primarily on use of logistic and support assets to support
PVO, GO and NGO plans
10. ROK Army must be prepared: likely to be the first impression of
how a unified government will deal with their "brethren" in the north
Table 4-3. SASO Analysis Recommendations for the ROK Army
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V. UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES FRAMEWORK FOR
EMPLOYMENT




The United States Army Special Forces have a long-standing relationship with the
ROK Army. This relationship is primarily with the ROK Special Forces brigades, and
focused on the conduct of warfighting missions in support of the defense oriented
contingency plan against a North Korean attack. However this relationship is typical for
USASF in that it establishes a very personal relationship, through interaction during the
conduct of warfighting training, between USASF soldiers and their ROK Army
counterparts. In this chapter I build on this base relationship to propose USASF' s unique
contribution to assist in stabilizing the tenuous situation in the North. This contribution
by USASF is presented as an employment framework. This chapter addresses the
following questions: 1) What are the defining elements in the USASF employment
framework I propose; 2) How do these defining elements address the broad spectrum of
unification; and finally, 3) How will USASF roles, as defined within the framework,
assist the ROK Army in successfully conducting the previously analyzed SASO missions
in the north. The limitations of the framework are important to address.
This framework is based on U.S. military doctrine as discussed in FM 100-23, FM
100-25, and FM 31-20. This framework is not a unilateral U.S. Army Special Forces
solution to stabilizing the north during the post-unification period. The framework is
designed to fit into an overall combined strategic plan for stabilizing the tenuous situation
in North Korea during the transition from a divided peninsula to a unified nation. U.S.
Special Forces commander's and planners should understand this, and not attempt to
replicate previous stability and support operations to Korea. For example, in the author's
opinion, exact application of the operational plan from Operation Uphold Democracy in
Haiti, to SASO operations in North Korea would be a mistake. From the political level to
the developed nature of South Korea, these two operations should be viewed as
significantly different. However, similarities will be analogous at the tactical level, and
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this is where lessons and experiences can be applied. The employment framework I
propose has USASF functioning in a support role, as part of a strategic plan, to assist the
ROK Army, and not an American designed blueprint for stabilizing the north during
unification.
How unification occurs only affects the scale of SASO problems in the north, not
whether the framework I propose is applicable. Regardless of where unification occurs
along the spectrum of unification, this framework can assist the ROK Army and the new
unified government stabilize situations in the north. Obviously the level of participation,
resources and commitment from other countries may be less if unification is realized from
a long-term gradual process, but only if the long-term process includes confidence-
building measures that improve the situation. North Korea simply muddling through for
the next ten years, with no substantial reform and improvement may make the problem
significantly worse. The Korean view of the best process for conducting SASO missions
is one area that may affect the applicability of the framework.
The possibility exists that a regional led effort, obviously excluding the U.S., may
be proposed as a means to resolve the SASO missions in the north. This situation does
not necessarily reject U.S. support, but may limit that support to providing resources
and/or training assistance without entering the north. The author accepts this political
dilemma that affects utilization of military assets, and concedes that the possibility exists.
However, pre-planning is never wasted if the remote chance of conducting the operation
exists. A key assumption underlies this framework.
Long-term commitment by the U.S. for conclusion of successful SASO missions
in the north is an important assumption. As the preceding analysis of SASO in North
Korea revealed, these problems are complex and monumental in nature. This is where
U.S. Army Special Forces make a key contribution to the U.S. strategic goal of regional
stability. USASF are an economy of force asset whose units and soldiers are trained to
focus on the long-term goal of host nation stabilization. This goal requires a rotating
schedule of deployments, and a deep commitment that USASF practices on a daily basis.
This commitment is mirrored by the civil affairs and psychological operations units that
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compose U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and whose efforts will be as critical
as USASF's to this overall combined campaign plan to assist stabilize the north.
I contend that the USASF framework for employment proposed is applicable
across the broad spectrum of Korean unification, with primary utility for the ROK Army
in the areas of assisting integrated planning, coordination with external agencies, train-up
for SASO missions, and bilateral mission execution. Through the framework, the U.S.
Army Special Forces contribute to the overall U.S. strategic objective of regional stability
by supporting the ROK Army's effort to conduct successful SASO missions and stabilize
the north. As mentioned in previous analysis, the ROK Army's success at conducting
SASO operations in the north is one of the critical factors to ensuring the government's
overall success at unification. The missions and roles assigned to USASF in the
employment framework are directed at assisting the Korean government achieve
successful unification by applying USASF' s unique capabilities primarily to assist the
ROK Army ensure success in conducting SASO missions in the north. Remembering
that success in relation to SASO missions is likely to require long-term effort.
In sections one and two I will define the employment framework's doctrinal
elements, and analyze its application across the spectrum of Korean unification scenarios.
Section three analyzes the utility of the employment framework in relation to the ROK
Army's conduct of SASO missions, identifying four aspects of critical support the
framework elements provide to the ROK Army. The concluding section summarizes the
all-encompassing benefits of the employment framework discussed throughout the
chapter.
A. DEFINING THE FRAMEWORK AND ITS ELEMENTS
The USASF employment framework consists of a foundation, USASF
employment elements, and the environment surrounding the application of the
framework. The foundation is composed of the SASO missions analyzed previously:
military restructuring, humanitarian assistance, and refugee management. The framework
employment elements include the doctrinal operations, missions, and unique roles
USASF will play in assisting the ROK Army in the conduct of SASO missions in the
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north. The environment surrounding the application of the framework consists of the four
unification scenarios: through war, short-of-war, absorption, and gradual phased
unification. The foundation and environment have been discussed in previous chapters,
and will not be reiterated in this chapter. In this section an analysis of the USASF
framework elements will be conducted beginning with the applicable doctrinal
operations.
1. Operations
The operations that comprise the USASF employment framework I propose are
peacekeeping and peace building. These operations and the spectrum of unification are
the key determinants as to how quickly the SASO missions identified are conducted. The
main difference between the two operations is the permissiveness of the operational
environment in respect to the area of operations. FM 1 10-23 defines these operations as
follows:
Peacekeeping operations - involve military and paramilitary
operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties.
Assistance activities may include the requirement to provide humanitarian assistance
within the area of operations, and demobilization of forces.
Peace Building - consists of postconflict actions that strengthen
and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict.
These operations are categorized as support to diplomacy. The permissiveness of the area
of operations determines the level of combat unit committed, and thus the
speed/efficiency with which the SASO missions identified are conducted. In a
peacekeeping operational environment the requirement for continued monitoring,
supervision and inspection of compliance to diplomatic agreements by the belligerent
parties significantly impacts the speed which missions are accomplished.
The speed that the area of operations enters the peace-building environment
greatly enhances the capability of those forces and agencies to provide efficient and
effective assistance to the effected parts of the country concerned. The longer a tenuous
post-conflict situation inhibits the ability to stabilize a country, the more apt the chance
84
that a destabilizing environment may develop. The specific missions contained within
the employment framework are discussed next.
2. Missions
The doctrinal missions assigned to USASF within the operational environment of
peacekeeping or peace building include foreign internal defense (FTD), humanitarian
assistance (HA), and coalition support. These missions are not unique to USASF alone,
but the focus of USASF in relation to the missions and the framework environment is
unique. It is important to define each mission in relation to USASF capabilities and
limitations. These primary missions and collateral activities are defined ass follows:
FID - to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and
paramilitary forces to help their government's protect their societies from lawlessness,
subversion, and insurgency.
HA - a collateral activity consisting of any military act or operation of a
humanitarian nature; these activities include disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation,
and support to and/or resettlement of displaced civilians. 3
Coalition Support - a collateral activity designed to improve the
interaction of coalition partners and U.S. military forces; this includes training,
coordination of combat support (CS) and combat service support, providing
communications capability, and facilitate integration into command and control systems.4
USASF has proven its capabilities in these mission areas as an economy of force
measure that delivers the maximum benefit for the minimum commitment. FTD can be an
integral part of a campaign plan to assist in the stabilization of a host nation. FTD
missions focus on training in support of the host nation attempts to secure its internal
situation, and develop a credible defense force for preventing external aggression. These
missions are directed at the host nation's military and paramilitary forces, and typically
involve exchange training between the USASF and host nation forces. FID missions also
focus on host nation internal support activities like civil support in the form of
MEDCAPS and ENCAPS in conjunction with the host nation military support units.
These FTD missions help build a better relation between the host nation military forces
and the general populous. USASF capabilities in HA missions are normally linked to
U.S. Civil Affairs efforts.
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USASF units involvement in HA missions is not intended to serve as a unilateral
U.S. assistance tool for helping host nations in these dire situations. USASF is best
utilized in a teamwork effort between U.S. Civil Affairs units and host nation efforts.
Currently U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USCAPOC) is
reviewing doctrine to better integrate planning and mission execution efforts between
U.S. forces in the conduct of missions.
5
Coordination and planning between USASF and
U.S. Civil Affairs units during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq is a prime
example of this inter-U.S. teamwork during HA missions.6 Operation Provide Comfort
showed how critical USASF is at ground level in HA situations. USASF positioned and
began initial relief efforts in the same extreme environment with the displaced Kurds.
This initial effort established the key trusting link that allowed the multi-national effort to
encourage the Kurd leadership to relocate. However, the small-scale relief capability of
an SFODA is not a replacement for a long-term HA success effort. USASF HA relief
capability is the gap measure between initial efforts and initiation of the long-term
solution. The collateral activity of coalition support will be highlighted next.
Coalition support provided by USASF is designed to ensure smooth integration of
coalition member nations efforts in a regional or multinational support situation. The
primary focuses for USASF is integration and coordination of each individual nation's
forces and support assets at the tactical or ground level into the operational level plan. In
a regional or multinational effort the assurance that each nations efforts are directed
toward accomplishing the overall mission is the primary purpose of this collateral
activity. The final element in the employment framework is the specific roles USASF
will occupy within the context of the employment framework.
3. Roles
In executing the above-mentioned doctrinal missions, USASF serve in the
following support roles: FID training teams, Liaison Control Elements (LCE), and Survey
Teams. FID training teams can conduct training in practically any environment. This
includes training foreign forces in the host nation or training several nations forces at a
removed site for conducting specific missions in support of a regional or coalition effort.7
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An LCE is used with a coalition force partner to provide status reporting, tactical or
technical planning assistance, training a coalition force on tactics, techniques, and
procedures, and control measure for combined mission execution. Survey teams
normally consist of organic SFODAs that conduct surveys of a situation in order to
provide critical planning information for follow-on missions. In some situation a survey
team may request additional military occupational specialists to accompany the team on a
survey. The next section will analyze how the USASF framework for employment may
be applied in relation to the spectrum of unification.
B. THE USASF EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO THE
SPECTRUM OF UNIFICATION
How the employment framework elements are incorporated within the confines of
the spectrum of unification environment, and the foundation of SASO missions is an
important variable that determines their effectiveness. Table 5-1 illustrates the USASF
Framework for Employment and identifies key points for planners to remember in
relation to the elements and the unification spectrum. In this section an analysis of each
element in relation to the spectrum of unification completes the contents of Table 5-1.
1. Operations
How USASF approaches post-unification efforts to assist the ROK Army is tied to
the environment through which unification occurs. In accordance with the four
unification scenarios presented, the ROK government is likely to approach the north from
a position of military strength at the start of any operation. This position of strength is
tied to the defense oriented wartime operational contingency plan that is exercised
throughout each year involving ROK-US forces. 8 This combined operational contingency
plan is likely to be the basis for launching stability and support operations in the north.
The two unification scenarios that include warfighting are unification through war
and the sue-for-peace scenario. The logical transition from warfighting to peacekeeping
is clear in these scenarios. The logistical assets, units and associations will be present to
transfer warfighting units to stability and support operations. However, this transition
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will not be smooth if post-conflict operational plans are not developed in detail by the
ROK political and military leadership.
The transition from peacekeeping to peace building operations is tied to several
operational factors. These factors include control of WMD, long range artillery, and
confidence in the DPRK military leaders non-aggression commitment. The primary
SASO mission to be completed first in these two unification scenarios is military
restructuring. The DPRK weapons, units and leaders must not be allowed to rally, and
reinitiate some form of disruptive aggression while post-unification efforts are being
conducted. Similarly, it is not likely that full-scale assistance and efforts to relieve the
populace's suffering are going to be effective until the Korean government can guarantee
a certain level of stability on the peninsula. The warfighting unification scenarios will
require patience in the transfer from peacekeeping to peace building. This transfer period
prolongs the assistance efforts to the populace and reduces the efficiency of any efforts
during the peacekeeping period. The operational environment existing in unification
through absorption will be discussed next.
The absorption of North Korea by the South does not necessarily reduce anxiety in
relation to stabilizing the situation in the north. In fact absorption may be a case where
due caution is a requirement. The ROK government will probably view absorption from
a cautious angle until the political and military elite bases of power can be ascertained
within the north. This will require the ROK leadership to begin SASO missions in the
north from a position of military strength within the peacekeeping operational
environment. This allows the ROK government to step-down the military strength aspect
in relation to the environment while conducting SASO missions. The mutual consent
unification scenario may be approached differently.
The confidence building measures completed by the two Koreas enroute to mutual
consent unification may necessitate SASO missions to begin from a peace building
operational environment. Additionally, mutual consent unification is not likely to be
finalized if either side fears for its security. Beginning operations in a peace building
environment will increase efficiency, and speed assistance to the populace in the north.
88
Again, the permissive environment associated with peace building versus peacekeeping is
the main variable for increased efficiency. The USASF missions associated with the
framework are analyzed next.
2. Missions
It is important to remember that the missions identified within the framework are
linked to the framework foundation of SASO issues confronting the ROK Army. In
reference to the warfighting and sue-for-peace unification scenarios this translates into
missions conducted prior to, or immediately after hostilities. The mission of foreign
internal defense will be discussed first.
a. Foreign Internal Defense
FTD training can be effectively incorporated in two broad areas to
assist the ROK Army in successfully completing the SASO missions identified. First is
training provided to units within the ROK Army, and second is training provided to
possible nations volunteering to assist in a regional or multinational coalition effort.
USASF FID training to the ROK Army should focus on post-conflict and/or post-
unification tasks in support of anticipated SASO missions in the north. Units to be
considered for FID training are the ROK Army Special Forces brigades, Civil Affairs
units, and ROK Army conventional units. The target training for each unit should be
directed at the tasks these units expect to conduct during the SASO missions identified.
In support of the SASO missions identified the ROK Army Special Forces
brigades should begin training on township stabilization and area surveys to assist the
follow-on units and organizations in the conducting of their specific tasks. Township
stabilization is a generic term I use that explains attempts to prevent chaos from
developing at the township level by establishing a direct link to the populace on events
and actions through soldiers living in the town. From an USASF perspective many of the
tasks associated with the mission of unconventional warfare are analogous with
stabilizing townships and the next level, provinces. In a mutual consent or all-out
absorption unification scenario these teams can link-up with North Korean units to assist
in information dissemination to the populace. Conduct of these tasks also provides a
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critical on-the-ground information source for the ROK government. ROK Civil Affairs
training does not necessarily need to change.
However, the amount and intensity of training should increase, and the
focus of operational planning must begin to discuss stability and support operations in the
north. USASF FID training in this area should be conducted in conjunction with
USCAPOC personnel from B Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. The goal of this
training should be to develop detailed plans for conducting stability and support
operations during post-conflict operations as detailed in the wartime contingency plan.
The lack of a detailed civil affairs plan was identified by both the ROK and U.S. Civil
Affairs planners at the recent ROK-US Civil Affairs conference, and this is an excellent
place to begin FID training for this ROK Army unit.9 The FID training for the ROK
Army conventional units is as important.
The ROK Army conventional force commanders that will be providing
personnel and logistical assets during the conduct of SASO missions require a paradigm
shift from their normal warfighting focus. As the U.S. Army has learned that the SASO
environment is not an easy transition for warfighters. 10 USASF led FID training can
focus training on those tasks associated with conducting SASO missions that have been
developed within the confines of U.S. military doctrine. In addition, providing
unrehearsed scenarios that focus on difficult situations for leaders and soldiers in the
SASO environment is very beneficial from a lessons learned standpoint. These scenarios
place units and their leaders in stressful situations like crowd control and food
distribution to ensure that training is as realistic as possible. USASF conducted FID
training for nations volunteering to assist in a regional or multinational effort is
highlighted next.
FID training for other nation military forces volunteering to assist Korea
on the road to stabilization should be directed at command and control, planning, and
tasks to be conducted. This FID training should occur prior to a contributing nation's
military forces enter the area of operations. The overall goal of this FID training is to
ensure unity of effort, and develop a similarity in the major operational aspects of mission
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execution. It is likely that this training will occur prior to a nation's forces entering the
area of operations. As an example, if the Southeast Asian nations volunteered forces as a
regional contribution to a larger multinational effort, then perhaps a FID preparation site
would be established in Thailand. These nations forces would transition through this
training site, and receive specific training and equipment, if required, to assist them
successfully complete their mission. This FID training is specifically designed to ensure
effective incorporation of contributing nation forces. As a reminder, these USASF FID
training missions are a preemptive training measure for fluid execution of SASO
missions by the ROK Army across the spectrum of unification. USASF and the
humanitarian assistance mission are analyzed next.
b. Humanitarian Assistance
USASF is a key link to assist the ROK Army during the conduct of HA
missions across the spectrum of unification. This link is intended to serve as a continuity
of effort control measure between the ROK civil-military operations planners and the
tactical level units executing the mission. USASF has extensive experience working at
the tactical level in HA missions, and this experience can assist ROK Army leaders
during the conduct of HA missions in the north. Typical problems that confront a unit at
the tactical level are security of logistical and support assets, interaction with disruptive
crowds, and categorizing personnel for assistance. Additionally, the tactical unit on the
ground encounters NGOs and PVOs that have their own agendas, sometimes diverging
from civil-military plans. USASF is a good tool to provide advice in these situations.
Finally, USASF' s HA experience prepares its detachments for the unpleasant
environment that is likely to exist in the north upon unification. By displaying a positive
attitude this can infuse the ROK Army with motivation during unsettling moments and
events that may lower morale. The Coalition Support mission in relation to the spectrum
of unification is analyzed next.
c. Coalition Support
Many variables and factors affect the conduct of this mission in relation to
post-unification SASO activities across the unification spectrum. Primarily the desire of
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the ROK and DPRK governments to allow nations to assist, not to mention the
international and regional opinions about which nations should participate. The author
contends that the scope of SASO missions identified establishes the requirement for the
ROK and DPRK governments to accept all assistance offered. The spectrum of
unification suggests that the approval process, due to diplomatic negotiation, for coalition
assistance in the north may be delayed in a sue-for-peace and gradual consent scenario as
opposed to unification through war or absorption. Regardless if other nations participate
in a regional or multinational effort, this mission is intended to provide for unity of effort
among contributing nations forces from the strategic to tactical level. An analysis of
USASF roles while conducting these missions is addressed next.
3. Roles
This subsection analyzes the roles of the USASF SFODA team on the ground in
relation to the missions, and how these roles assist the ROK Army during conduct of
SASO missions. Within the support intent of the framework, these roles serve as the
vehicles for USASF to provide assistance to the ROK Army in executing the intent of a
Korean civil-military operational plan, and not U.S. attempts to direct Korean decision-
makers at any level. The titles of the roles USASF personnel will fill display this support
intent: FID Training Team, Liaison Control Element (LCE), and Survey Team. These
specific roles are analyzed in relation to the spectrum of unification.
a. FID Training Teams
USASF planners should begin planning FID Programs of Instruction (POI)
to address those aspects of training in support of the employment framework. At the
USASF FID training team level, Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs) should
focus on training in support of the SASO mission with the ROK SF, CA, and
conventional units should be the first priority. Simultaneously the regional JCET
program should address building regional support through military to military training in
the area of SASO missions. This military to military contact is an excellent method for
establishing a commitment with regional nations for future assistance in a coalition effort
to assist Korea.
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b. Liaison Control Elements
LCEs are currently functioning at the ROK SF brigade level in support of
OPLAN 5027. This relationship assists operational level integration of ROK SF efforts
into the combined strategic warfighting plan. The same relationship is useful for ROK
Army and coalition partners efforts during the conduct of SASO missions in the north. If
stabilization efforts in the north during Korean unification and post-unification activities
are regional or multi-national in flavor, then coalition support in the form of LCEs will be
a critical mission area for USASF. USASF LCEs are able to advise and assist tactical
level planners in many areas. These areas include: execution tasks involved in SASO
missions, integration and coordination of military efforts, and coordination with NGOs
and PVOs. Through this advice and assistance USASF LCEs serve as a critical economy
of force measure that results in a unity of effort for the ROK Army and coalition partners.
c. Survey Teams
Regardless of how unification occurs, SFOD-A teams are a great asset for
conducting surveys of the situation in North Korea area prior to conducting SASO
missions. In accordance with the framework intent these survey teams should be
combined in nature. The experience that USASF has in SASO missions at the ground
level can assist the ROK Army conduct realistic timely surveys to assist in follow-on
SASO missions. These survey teams can transition to serve as pilot teams in receiving









1 . OPLAN 5027 a good operational foundation;
2. ROK likely to begin operations from a position of
strength;





4. SASO oriented FID effort should begin immediately in
ROK: incorporate FID training into JCS exercises UFL
and Foal Eagle in FY 98;
5. Focus regional JCETs on SASO type missions to build





6. Regional USASF Group should begin in-depth tactical
level planning focusing on these roles SFOD-A teams
will execute.
SASO
Table 5-1. USASF Employment Framework as Applied to Spectrum of Unification
C. HOW THE EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK ASSISTS THE ROK ARMY
CONDUCT SASO
The employment framework benefits the ROK Army in two primary areas:
integration and coordination for both planning and mission execution. Integration refers
to those planning processes and measures used to ensure that ROK Army efforts are
linked to inter-Korean efforts. Coordination refers to those planning processes and
measures used to ensure ROK Army efforts are linked to the overall theater level plan,
including operations with NGO's and PVO's.
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1. Integrated Planning
The government in Seoul established the ROK Ministry of National Unification
(MNU) to develop policy and plans for unification of the Korean peninsula. 1 ' Part of the
MNU's planning is focused on conducting the types of stability and support operations I
outlined above during a unification short-of-war scenario. However, currently the ROK
MNU considers the task of stability and support operations their business alone if
unification is not a by-product of war. According to Major Walter Pjetraj, C5/USFK,
"The ROK Army has very little to do with unification efforts if there is not a fight. This
task belongs squarely on the ROK Ministry of National Unification. The ROK Army has
a role, but very small."
12
Initiatives are underway to remedy this critical shortfall in
integrated planning.
Beginning in 1997 the Combined Forces Command (CFC) Civil Affairs staff
section focused a series of initiatives designed to highlight the need for integrated
planning of civil affairs actions between civilian and military officials. First was an ROK
JCS Staff Officer visit at Ft. Bragg, NC in June 1997. This visit provided an overview of
U.S. Civil Affairs organizations, training, and the relationship between senior military
and government officials in the United States. The second initiative was a combined
ROK-U.S. Civil Affairs conference held in September 1997. This conference provided a
forum of exchange for ROK and U.S. military officers to discuss issues of mutual
concern in performing combined Stability and Support operations in conjunction with
OPLAN 5027. 14 The ability of the ROK Army to successfully complete the stability and
support operations outlined in this chapter will be greatly enhanced by detailed integrated
planning between the ROK Army, ROK MND, and ROK MNU. The same dedicated
staff planning that produced the war time operational contingency plan must be applied to
the integrated planning process. Like the unification fund, the time to begin integrated
planning for stability and support operations is now as the situation in the North continues
to spiral downward.
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USASF SFOD-A teams working at the tactical level can assist the ROK Army
during the planning phase to ensure that operations and phasing of events are
deconflicted. Synchronizing of logistics, support units, and internal crisis management
are critical for timely and organized execution. USASF currently provide this type of
tactical level integration advice for the ROK SF brigades. Through USASF initiated FID
training that targets command and control processes during SASO missions, USASF can
begin integrating the operational aspects of the ROK Army. During the conduct of SASO
missions in the North, USASF LCEs are an excellent tool to cross-check efficiency of
operations, while providing the ROK Army critical operational advice and ensuring
integration of valuable assets. USASF can also provide the same form of assistance
between the ROK Army and the many external agencies likely to be involved in the effort
to stabilize the north.
2. Coordination
Synchronization of stability and support efforts must occur throughout the entire
area of operations. Coordination of military and non-military efforts is of utmost
importance to ensure that support is provided where it is most required. For U.S. military
doctrine, this coordination typically occurs in a civil military operations center or CMOC.
Whether ROK civil-military planners adopt U.S. terminology is irrelevant. The
coordination that occurs is similar to integrating military planning efforts, only at a higher
level. This level of coordination is where U.S. Civil Affairs planners contribute as a key
asset. Knowing that this coordination is critical is where the SFOD-A team is
indispensable. Working to ensure that ROK Army operations deconflict, while
synchronizing and supporting the overall theater level plan is a prime coordination
function for an SFOD-A team serving as LCE.
D. CONCLUSION
As the situation in the north continues on a downward slide, deterrence through
military strength is the best assurance for conflict prevention. Planning for possible
conflict has been the priority effort for military planners, and with good reason. This
focus on deterrence however should not blind military and civilian planners from
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conducting concrete planning for the obvious actions that must be confronted upon
unification, regardless of the deterrence outcome. The USASF employment framework I
suggest is an attempt to address USASF's focus during post-conflict operations.
The USASF employment framework addresses supporting a unified Korean
government by providing military expertise, advice and assistance to the ROK Army
during the conduct of stability and support operations. The employment framework
espouses the utility of USASF at the tactical level in the roles of LCE, FID training team
and survey team, while conducting FTD, HA and Coalition Support missions in relation to
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations on the peninsula. Stressed throughout the
employment framework is the relation of these elements to the SASO foundation
problems, and the environment surrounding how unification results. The framework
elements are not unique in themselves. However, viewing the elements in conjunction
with the problems in the north, and considering the difficult environments the spectrum
of unification presents, offers a complete picture for employing USASF during post-
conflict operations. The next chapter concludes this thesis with implementing
recommendations for the USASF employment framework.
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VI. EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTING
RECOMMENDATIONS
A hypothetical recommendation is for the ROK and U.S. National Command
Military Authority's (NCMA) to agree on strategic guidance for post-conflict operations
in the north, and to submit this guidance to the ROK-US Military Committee for further
combined development. Following a plenary and permanent session, the military
committee would provide guidance to the CINCCFC for immediate postconflict
operational planning by all levels of staffs (both ROK and U.S.). 1 However, this
communication channel for strategic guidance is not a channel that is likely to produce
guidance in a timely manner. The politics of decision-making at the NCMA level on the
peninsula necessitate many years of negotiating before guidance as drastic as this
hypothetical recommendation can occur. The recommendations I suggest are less drastic,
more negotiable by a combined command, and designed to ensure that the U.S. military
planners do not appear to be developing a hegemonistic plan designed to solve all of
Korea's post-unification problems. This chapter addresses recommendations tailored to
assist with the implementation of the USASF employment framework. However, these
recommendations should be viewed as part of an overall theater level strategic plan to
begin focusing on the conduct of stability and support operations (SASO) in North Korea.
The USASF employment framework is only a small, but integral, part of this theater level
plan.
The implementing recommendations are divided into strategic, operational, and
tactical level suggestions to assist in the implementation of the USASF employment
framework. These implementing recommendations are directed at U.S. military
commanders and staff planners throughout the command channels involved in Korea. In
some instances, it is required for operational and tactical planners to begin planning for
operations that they assume will occur, but due to sensitivity political and senior military
leaders, cannot openly provide direct guidance. The combined command environment on
the Korean peninsula is one of these instances.
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This chapter consists of three levels of implementing recommendations and a
conclusion. Section one addresses strategic level recommendations, and Section two
addresses operational level recommendations, Finally the tactical level implementing
recommendations are highlighted. The strategic level implementing recommendations
include ensuring that: 1) the post-conflict operational phase of OPLAN 5027 is
thoroughly planned and integrated into Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level exercises, and 2)
regional Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises are focused on SASO
missions. Operational level implementing recommendations include: 1) USFK planners
focusing on improving Korean military integrated planning capability, and 2) planners
developing the concept for SASO oriented Foreign Internal Defense (FID) training with
ROK military units. Tactical level implementing recommendations include: 1) conduct
detailed mission analysis for SASO missions outlined in framework; 2) prepare SFOD-B
and SFOD-A teams to conduct their unique roles in accordance with framework; 3)
develop programs of instruction focused on SASO missions for ROK SF, CA and
Conventional military units, and 4) actively seek JCETs that focus on SASO throughout
the region.
A. STRATEGIC LEVEL IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategic level policymakers should begin focusing equal efforts on post-conflict
operations in accordance with OPLAN 5027, and shaping the regional environment in
preparation for stabilizing the north after unification. These recommendations are
directed at the U.S. military command structure on the peninsula (CFC and UNC), and
USCINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii. The relationship between CINCCFC, CINCUNC
and USCINCPAC commanders is critical to efficient operations as CDMCPAC provides
the forces for operations on the peninsula. This strategic level provides the guidance for
staff planning of ROK-US military units. The guidance to emphasize SASO mission
planning in accordance with the postconflict operational phase of OPLAN 5027 is critical
for implementing the framework elements analyzed prior to chaos ensuing in the north.
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1. Emphasize Post-conflict Operations
Strategic level commanders should direct detailed planning of the post-conflict
operational phase of OPLAN 5027 by all staff elements. This planning effort should be
conducted simultaneously to assure continuity of effort and to focus all staff officers
within the various commands. The end result of this guidance should produce completed
annexes to OPLAN 5027 for the post-conflict operational phase. These annexes will
establish task organization, logistics support and the phasing of operations and missions.
The key point in the planning is the combined effort of ROK-US planners to establish the
combined piece of post-conflict operations. However, as Major General Raymond P.
Ayers, Jr., CINCCFC ACofS CJ5 remarked, "For the combined planning effort to move
forward we (ROK-US military leaders) must agree to agree where we can, and bypass
areas of disagreements not allowing these differing viewpoints or lack of political
guidance to stop the entire planning effort."2 This may not result in a complete product
for execution, but it does provide the means to evaluate what has been developed during
the two annual JCS military exercises held on the peninsula.
Ulchi Focus Lens and Foal Eagle, operational names for JCS military exercises
held annually on the peninsula must begin focusing an equal amount of effort on the
postconflict operations phase of OPLAN 5027. Specific focus on those actions in the
north following conflict will provide a method for evaluating the conduct of SASO
missions in the north following war. This focus will assist the ROK Army as it evaluates
these SASO missions in the post-conflict environment, and allow USASF staff planners
to recommend implementation of the framework elements as a method to support the
ROK Army's efforts. Guidance from strategic level leadership directing a focus on post-
conflict operations will ensure that SASO missions are proportioned equal planning and
evaluation effort at the operational level. Focusing regional JCETs on stability and
support FID missions will assist in the implementation of the framework elements.
2. Regional JCET Focus
The Commander in Chief Pacific Command establishes the Pacific Theater
strategic guidance for the JCET program. Under the FID umbrella, the JCET program is
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a cost-effective tool for CINCPAC to engage countries throughout the Pacific Theater. In
order to assist implementation of the framework a larger percentage of JCETs throughout
the Pacific Theater should engage countries by providing SASO oriented FID training.
This FID training by USASF SFOD-A teams should focus on Medical Capabilities
(MEDCAPS), Engineering Capabilities (ENCAPS) and Disaster Assistance Relief
Training (DART) type training activities. Increasing the number of countries in the
region that are capable of performing these types of missions for their own benefit is an
engagement goal. However, relative to the employment framework, these countries may
be critical regional partners in a coalition effort; building a base level of proficiency in
these missions ensures they are able to contribute in the most efficient manner. For
countries like Thailand, continuing SASO-oriented JCETs only improves their
capabilities to be an asset in a coalition effort. Strategic level planners may want to
engage Thailand, Malaysia or Singapore as possible contingency JCET training centers,
similar to Puerto Rico during Operation Uphold Democracy, for the training of countries
participating in a regional effort. The JCET program is an excellent method to engage
China.
Military-to-military engagement with China prior to the uncertain and chaotic
times of possible Korean unification may prevent tension, and also provide an
opportunity to begin discussions of China's participation in SASO mission in the north.
One recommendation is to focus on conducting MEDCAPS and ENCAPS along the
China - North Korean border. USASF SFOD-A teams working and training alongside
Chinese military personnel conducting these missions will build an important bond that,
in the long-term, will assist the ROK Army if coalition efforts result in stabilizing the
north. Additionally, the North Koreans living along the border will see U.S. military
personnel living, training, and providing assistance to the Chinese population in
conjunction with Chinese military forces. This will help improve the legitimacy of U.S.
forces when, and if U.S. forces are involved in stabilizing the north. Operational
implementing recommendations are next.
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B. OPERATIONAL LEVEL IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS
Operational level planners should begin an effort designed to clear up the
ambiguity currently surrounding the post-conflict phase of OPLAN 5027. This effort will
create an environment where U.S. planners are constantly trying to speed the decision-
making process of ROK military planners. In an attempt to finish the deliberate planning
process, U.S. planners are typically frustrated by their Korean counterpart's ability to
provide concrete information and commit to a course of action. Maj. Gen. Ayers
commented in respect to this combined planning element of frustration, "Typically the
side that has a plan prepared in a moment of chaos, ends up executing that plan regardless
of how much frustration has occurred in the past between the combined commands
during planning." 3 Operational level implementing recommendations include improving
Korean military integrated planning processes and developing FID SASO objectives for
ROK military units.
1. ROK Army Integrated Planning
Continuing the efforts initiated by ROK-US Civil Affairs units to improve civil-
military planning processes is a great start in effort to improve the overall integrated
planning ability of the ROK Army. In accordance with the employment framework, an
association by USASF LCEs at the tactical level of ROK Army CA and Conventional
units is the next step. Beginning a habitual association will work best for long-term
efficiency, and should focus on those units expected to conduct SASO missions in a post-
conflict operational environment. USASF LCEs should begin this habitual association as
soon as possible. The building of trust between counterparts is essential to this process
and, in some situations can take years to develop. Prioritizing ROK Army units that
should receive USASF LCE assistance is critical to ensuring that USASF manning
constraints can be met during the annual JCS training exercises on the peninsula. The
USFK's staff should develop FID SASO objectives to guide the efforts of USASF in
providing FID training to the ROK Army for SASO missions.
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2. Developing FID Objectives
Establishing FID objectives for the ROK Army units that focus on SASO
missions is necessary before training can begin. In accordance with the employment
framework, the following units would benefit from USASF conducted FID training that
focus on the SASO type missions analyzed. This training will be the same as that
provided to other countries, and should include those specific activities the employment
framework suggests. Particularly, ROK SF units conducting province and township
surveys and stabilization missions throughout North Korea in the initial phases of post-
conflict or unification through another means. ROK CA units require more command-
and-control training, as well as practical experience. Currently, ROK CA units conduct
only seven days of training a year, and this includes a three-day mobilization period. I
recommend expanding ROK CA training to two 14-day periods a year corresponding
with the annual JCS exercises held on the peninsula. FID training for ROK Conventional
units should focus on the different operational environment they will confront during
post-conflict operations or if unification occurs somewhere else along the spectrum of
unification. FTD training for these units should discuss the principles of stability and
support operations, and conduct unit level exercises that test these units ability to apply
principles while conducting a SASO mission scenario. Tactical level implementing
recommendations are given last.
C. TACTICAL LEVEL IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Army 1 st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1 st SFG (A)) is the tactical
level unit that will be providing the majority of the SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams who will
provide 'boots on the ground' in accordance with the employment framework. I
recommend that the Commander, 1 st SFG (A) implement a continuous push-pull staff
planning effort to gain the required information to begin extensive planning for the
tactical portion of USASF' s contribution to post-conflict operations within OPLAN 5027.
Implementing recommendations for the tactical level include: 1) detailed mission analysis
of SASO missions; 2) SFOD-A and B team preparation; 3) develop FID Programs of
Instruction (POI); finally 4) actively promote SASO oriented JCET missions. I will
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further discuss the first two recommendations as they are specific to the tactical level,
while the latter two recommendations must be implemented at the strategic and tactical
level prior to 1
st SFG (A) being able to execute.
1. SASO Mission Analysis
The staff of 1 st SFG (A) should conduct extensive mission analysis of the SASO
missions I contend are the foundation of the employment framework. Classified analysis
will further define the problems and provide a critical level of expertise that is sometimes
lacking in LCEs as the chaos of a mission has an SFOD-A and SFOD-B team scrambling
for mission-essential equipment and rucksacks. The staff elements within USASFC (A),
USASOC and USACAPOC can provide information and assistance in this effort. Seizing
the initiative now will ensure the tactical level teams are as prepared as possible to
conduct this integral portion of stabilizing the north and to provide support to the ROK
Army. This analysis will not only help better define the employment framework, but will
identify key logistical requirements for the conduct of these missions for the tactical level
teams. I recommend that the majority of this analysis remain unclassified in order to
ensure dissemination of information in the fastest manner. Continuous flow of
information, formatted to address the actions required by the tactical teams, will ensure
that a last minute cram session of information for planning is not required. Preparation
can assist tactical teams perform better in any environment.
2. SASO Mission Training
SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams at 1 st SFG (A) should focus on conducting training
in accordance with the operations, missions, and roles identified in the USASF
employment framework. The employment framework assists this effort by establishing a
foundation of SASO missions to be conducted within the spectrum of unification
environment that may exist on the peninsula. SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams typically
conduct many tasks that span the employment framework suggested when conducting
FID and other missions required for the teams to be considered certified and deployable.
However, focusing on the Korean peninsula as viewed by the employment framework
shapes the principles and techniques discussed in the field manuals, and inserts a sense of
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urgency for gaining proficiency in the tasks required for successful completion of the
missions. Developing scenarios that evaluate SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams is as critical
for their proficiency as it is for host nation forces at the end of a FID training event. The
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) provides an excellent opportunity for SFOD-A
and SFOD-B teams to evaluate their capability in the challenging SASO environment.
The last tactical level recommendation I suggest is a basic one, but probably the most
important. USASF pride themselves on language skills and cultural awareness. SFOD-A
and SFOD-B teams must ensure that these two critical areas receive adequate attention.
As in any environment, when everything fails because the frameworks are too vague,
analysis is proven wrong, plans go awry, or paradigms shift, the USASF soldier must
always fall back on his best tool, namely, his mind.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The implementing recommendations are presented in descending order of
importance to emphasize that strategic and operational level decisions must occur that
focus planning on stability and support operations in North Korea now, in order to ensure
timely assistance to benefit the ROK Army during SASO missions in the north. The
signals of desperation are clearly emanating from the north. Simply having a great
defensive plan that defeats the north if they attack, is not preparing to tackle the hardest
problems unification will present. I am reminded of General Maxwell R. Thurman's
comment of post-conflict operations following Operation Just Cause, "I did not spend
five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC in August
( 1988). . . We put together the campaign plan for Just Cause and probably did not spend
enough time on the restoration."5 Blind Logic referred to the plan for post-conflict
restoration operations in Panama. Too many times we find that planning for combat
receives 90% of planners' efforts while post-conflict operations and the destabilizing
environments they create, causes insurmountable problems for the government that
survives as the victor in war. The USASF employment framework I developed, and the
implementing recommendations suggested, are an attempt to focus efforts more equitably
between planning for conflict and post-conflict operations.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARISON OF NORTH KOREAN AND SOUTH KOREAN
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMBAT SYSTEMS.
























Support vessels 50 335
Submarines 4 35 4
Air
Force
Tactical aircraft 530 840





(1) Transformed 35,000 enlisted defense call-up to active service in accordance
with the abrogation of enlisted defense call-up system; Marine Corps troops
are included in the Navy.
(2) The Marine Corps troops who are organized into the Army are included in the
Army.
(3) Including Marine Corps divisions
(4) Including nine midget submarines
(5) South Korea: reserve forces, replacement forces
(6) North Korea: Instruction Guidance Units, Worker and Farmer Red Guards,
Young Red Guards, People's Guards
Source: Reproduced with permission from Joon-Lai Che, Editorial Manager, ROK
Defense White Paper 1996-1997.
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APPENDIX B: NORTH KOREA PROVINCIAL AND MAJOR CITIES
CIVILIAN POPULATION DENSITY, (IN THOUSANDS) YEAR-END
1996, EXTRAPOLATED DATA FROM 1987 DPRK CSB DATA.
Province Population Population Area Density
Major Cities 1987 1 1997 2 (sq. km) (persons
per sq. km)





North Pyongan 3 2,408 2841 12,191 233
Kusong 177 209
Sinuiju 289 341




South Hwanghae 1,914 2259 8,002 282
Haeju 195 230
North Hwanghae 1,409 1663 8,007 208
Sariwon 221 261
Songnim 108 127
Kangwon 1,227 1448 11,152 130
Wonsan 274 323








Yanggang 628 741 14,317 52
Hyesan 164 194
Pyongyang Municipality 2,355 2779 2,000 1,390
Kaesong Municipality4 331 391 1,255 312
Nampo Municipality 5 715 844 753 1,121
Total Provincial/Munic. 18,718 22,090
Total Major Cities6 5,452 6,435
1 1987 data is from Table 3 and Table 6 in Eberstadt's "The Population of North Korea".
2 1997 data is extrapolated using a growth factor of 1.8% annually for 10 years or 18% over 10 years.
3
Includes the Hyonsan Special district.
4
Includes the City of Kaesong which has a population of 120,000 within the municipality.
5
Includes the City of Nampo which has a population of 370,000 within the municipality.
6
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